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NOTE
The Private Rights of a Bidder
in the Award of a Government Contract:
A Step Beyond ScanwelI
Traditionally,bidders on federal government contracts have been held
to possess no enforceable rights against the procuring agency. Though
they had a substantial economic stake in receiving the contract, bidders
lacked standing to contest an award to a competitor. In the last three
years, United States Courts of Appeals in two circuits have held that the
bidder has standing as a representative of the public interest in proper
procurement. The author examines these recent developments and concludes they disclose an increased judicial awareness of the need to protect the bidder's economic interests. After discussing several reasons why
the no-private-rightsrule is no longer suitable for defining contemporary
procurement relationships, he asserts that the true reason for this
longstanding rule is a judicial reluctance either to interfere with contractingofficer discretion or to risk obstructingthe vital procurement fundtion. Concluding that these considerations do not justify ignoring the
interests of the bidder, the authorproposes a solution for recognizing the
bidder's rights without jeopardizing the public's interest in efficient
procurement.
I.

INTRODUCTION

SINCE 1940, bidders on federal government contracts have been
denied access to the courts for challenging awards made to competing bidders. Although a plethora of guidelines, derived from
statutes and regulations, exist to govern the procedure for awarding
a contract, under the Supreme Court's holding in Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co.' the bidder has no standing to enforce them.
In Lukens, against a backdrop of an intensified military buildup, the Court was confronted with deciding whether a supplier of
iron and steel to the government could enjoin federal officials from
implementing a minimum wage program. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit had held for the company by
ruling that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of her powers under the Walsh-Healy Ace was unwarranted and defeated the purpose of the Act 2 As a result the implementation of the Act's minimum wage requirements had been enjoined for over a year. The
Supreme Court voted to reverse, but never reached the merits. De1310 U.S.
2 41

113 (1940).

U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
3 Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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termining that the laws regulating the procurement process were
not enacted to protect private bidders on government contracts, the
Court held the bidder had no litigable rights to enforce.4 Under
the conventional notions of that time, no enforceable rights meant
no standing to sue.
For thirty years, the standing obstacle created by Lukens kept
aggrieved bidders out of all federal courts. Then the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opened the door in
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer.' Even though bidders may
now have standing to sue, the specter of Lukens is still very apparent. The Court's characterization in Lukens of the overall system
of contracting-out - the interests that procurement laws were intended to protect, the discretion accorded contracting officers, and
the primary focus on efficient and unhindered procurement - continues to have a significant impact on the reasoning of the courts.
They have repeatedly adhered to the essence of the Lukens doctrine:
an enterprise enjoys no legal rights of its own when competing for
a contract award. 6
Even if the unwillingness of the Court in Lukens to interfere
with the procurement process made sense in the prewar atmosphere
of 1940, such judicial reluctance has little merit today. The economic repercussions of government procurement decisions pervade
the private sector;' many firms and communities depend for their
existence on receiving contract awards from the government. This
U.S. at 126.
5424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cit. 1970). Because substantially all of the procurement
controversies arise in the District of Columbia, most of the case law has evolved in
that circuit's court of appeals. Only one other circuit to date has explicitly followed
Scanwell and held that bidders possess standing. Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233
(3d Cir. 1973). Two circuits have left the question open. Allen M. Campbell Co. v.
Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971); Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v.
United States, 443 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971). In a subesequent case, however, the
Fifth Circuit held that a potential bidder had standing to litigate particular issues. Ray
Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir, 1973). But because
this decision was premised, at least in part, on a congressional design to protect the
plaintiffs' interests under the Small Business Act, it is doubtful that the Fifth Circuit's
holding on the standing issue extends to all bidders.
The Supreme Court has made no attempt to resolve the question. Its last decision
on a bidder's standing was Lukens. Recently the Court has denied certiorari in two
cases. Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974
(1972); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 950 (1971). In lieu of any statement from the Supreme Court, Scanwell
remains the principal authority for granting the bidder standing.
6
E.g., Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cit. 1970).
7For fiscal 1972, it is estimated that the federal government contracted-out for a
total of $57.5 billion of goods and services. Department of Defense procurements
alone amounted to $39.4 billion. 1 REPORT OF THE COMM'N GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROCUREMENT REP.].
4310
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acute potential for widespread economic injury is accompanied by
a growing recognition that citizens enjoy a right to expect and demand fair treatment when dealing with their government. When
the government wields economic power this vast, its actions must
be subject to some degree of judicial scrutiny.8 Furthermore, the
impact of procurement on private individuals is intensified by the
expanded use of the government contract as a tool for accomplishing nonprocurement social and economic objectives. 9
In view of this pervasive influence, it is curious that the actions
of government contracting officers remained immune from judicial
intervention for so long. Even a critic of the Scanwell decision noted
that the tremendous economic and social effects made judicial review
of the procurement process virtually inevitable.' Conceptually, the
selection of a government contractor is no different from other
agency determinations which, under the traditional tenets of administrative law, have been reviewable whenever the administrator
abuses his discretion or exceeds his statutory authority. It is the
clear directive of Congress, under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), that the courts are to set aside any agency action that
is arbitrary or unlawful." This Note will explore the policies that
have been invoked for shielding contracting decisions from judicial
review and examine whether they are of sufficient import to justify
treating procurement activity differently from other areas of administrative action.
The procedures governing the award of government contracts to
private businesses were established by Congress under the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194712 (ASPA) for awards by the military and by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
under Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949'3 (FPASA) for awards by most other civilian agencies.
Pursuant to these statutes comprehensive procurement regulations
8 Speech by Judge Harold Leventhal, Government Contracts Seminar, Charlottesville,
Virginia, May 9, 1969. 274 BNA FED. CONT. REP. A-i (1969).
9 An example is the program developed under section 8(a) of the Small Business
Act of 1953, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970), whereby the Small Business Administration
makes noncompetitive subcontract awards to minority-owned businesses.
10 Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards: Its
Origins, Rationale and Effect on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 1, 41 (1970).
1 APA § 10(c)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
12 10 U.S.C. §§ 2013-14 (1970).
1341 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (1970).
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have been promulgated. 1 4 These laws provide two general methods
for awarding contracts to private businesses: formal advertising
and negotiation.
Under formal advertising (or competitive bidding) prospective
contractors are invited to submit sealed 'bids in response to specifications contained in the invitation. The award is then made to
the responsible bidder whose offer is "most advantageous" to the
government. 15 Generally this means the lowest bidder. 1 6 Formal
advertising is the preferred method for making awards; the statutes provide it is to be used whenever feasible and practicable.
But if certain specified conditions are met, award by negotiation is
8
authorized.1
Through negotiated procurement the government has wider latitude in selecting a contractor and determining a contract price. The
procuring authority typically does not rely on the initial proposals
submitted, but holds discussions with the potential contractors to bargain for the best terms. In contrast to formal advertising, where
price is the sole determinant of who receives the award, negotiation
involves "tradeoffs" between price and quality or other considerations that must be weighed by the contracting officer. Nevertheless,
even in negotiated procurement, price is usually an important and
often critical factor in determining the most advantageous proposal.'" And even when negotiation is authorized, some degree of
competition is required. For example, on negotiated armed services awards in excess of $2,500 the government must solicit proposals from the maximum number of qualified sources feasible and
then hold discussions with all offerors whose proposals are within
14 Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.100 to 30.9 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as ASPR]; Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.000
to 1-30.710 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FPR]. In addition, individual agencies have
supplemented the ASPR and FPR with procurement regulations of their own. E.g.,
Atomic Energy Commission Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. §§ 9-1.101 to 9-59.006
(1972); National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procurement Regulations, 41
C.F.R. §§ 18-1.100 to 18-52.508 (1972).
15 Section 3(b) of the ASPA, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970), provides in part: "Awards
shall be made ... to the responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and will
be most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors considered." The
language of the comparable provision in the FPASA is similar. 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)
(1970).
16 See notes 195-97 infra & accompanying text.
17 10 U.S.C. § 2 304 (a) (1970); see 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1970).
18 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(1)-(17) (1970); 41 U.S.C. §§ 252(c)(1)-(15) (1970).
19 1 PRocUREMENr REP., supra note 7, at 19.
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a competitive range.2 0 The procurement system thus encourages
some competition among prospective contractors, whichever method
is used. 1
Until recently the bidder who believed that a contract was unjustifiably awarded to one of hi's competitors had only two routes
for obtaining redress. He could protest the award to the contracting officer who made it,2 2 or he could seek review by the General
Accounting Office (GAO).3 Within the last few years, courts
aware of the bidder's plight have developed judicial remedies to
supplement these protests to. administrative agencies. First the
Court of Claims began to fashion a right to recover the expenses
incurred in preparing a bid that was not given fair and honest consideration 4 Then Scanwell authorized the bidder to sue for injunctive relief.
Once the District of Columbia Circuit lifted the standing bar in
Scanwell, the courts were forced for the first time to delve deeply
into the substance of Lukens, to determine the degree to which the
laws regulating procurement placed enforceable restrictions on the
award of government contracts. The decisions after Scanwell have
attempted to articulate guidelines for judicial interference with procurement. In Page Communications Enginers, Inc. v. Resor,25 the
court of appeals outlined the criteria for granting the bidder a preliminary injunction: In addition to considering the bidder's likelihood of success on the merits and the harm he stood to incur, the
district courts were to accord prominence to the strong public interest in unimpeded procurement. 26 The proper scope of judicial re20 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1970). This requirement was added to the ASPA in 1962.
Act of Sept. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-653, § I(c), 76 Stat. 528. There is no equivalent
provision in the FPASA. That statute permits negotiations of any type that the agency
head believes "will promote the best interests of the Government." 41 U.S.C. § 254 (a)
(1970). This includes noncompetitive "sole-source" negotiations. But both the ASPR
and the FPR. mandate that negotiations must be competitive unless certain exceptions
are satisfied. 32 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.101(c) (1972). Among these
exceptions is the proviso to section 2304(g) that permits acceptance of an initial proposal without conducting discussions when it is clearly demonstrated that the proposal
would result in fair and reasonable prices. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1970).
21 In fiscal year 1970 only 13.8 percent of the dollar amount of military contracts
was awarded by formal advertising; the other 86.2 percent was negotiated. But 43 percent of the total was awarded under some competitive method. See Wheelabrator Corp.
v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1313 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22
See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 2.407-8 (1972).
23
The rules governing these protests are set out at 4 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.12 (1973).
2
4Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
25 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F.5 84,154 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2
61d. at 89,999-16.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 559

view was considered in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,27 where the
court held that a contracting officer's decision should be set aside
only if no rational basis for it exists. And in Wheelabrator Corp.
v. Chafee,2 the court discussed favorably the availability of bid
protest review by the GAO and suggested that many procurement
issues may be within that office's primary jurisdiction.
The tenor of these post-Scanwell decisions is that the policy of
the federal courts should be to minimize the extent of judicial intervention into the procurement process.2 9 Most of the commentary
on these cases has construed them as severely constricting the bidder's opportunity for judicial review, in effect negating the inroads
made by Scanwell. ° This Note will consider whether these cases
do manifest an effort to retract the review granted bidders in the
Scanwell case. The conclusion reached is that, to the contrary,
the courts have become increasingly aware of the need to protect
the bidder's private interest in fair competition for contract awards.
Although the progeny of Scanwell do articulate finite limitations
on judicial scrutiny, these limitations are nothing more than an attempt to balance this private interest against the well-entrenched
public interests in administrative discretion and unhindered procurement. These public values have until recently been deemed of
sufficient import to shield procurement from any judicial intervention whatsoever. This Note concludes that they should be secured,
not by refusing to recognize or enforce the bidder's private interests,
but rather by developing more accommodating procedures and remedies for redressing the bidder's economic injuries.
THOSE SEPARATE BUT CONFUSED QUESTIONS OF
STANDING, THE MERITS, AND ENFORCEABLE INTERESTS
II.

A.

The Development of Bidder's Standing from
Lukens to Scanwell
The reasons why, until 1970, the courts were completely closed
27
28
29

455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
455 F.2 d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
E.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

E.g., Note, Judicial Review and Remedies for the Unsuccessful Bidder on Federal
Government Contracts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 496, 517 (1972) (" . • . unsuccessful bidders
will, in the future, experience great difficulty in successfully challenging procurement decisions through actions for injunctive relief."); Comment, Judicial Review for Disappointed Bidders on Federal Government Contracts, 26 Sw. L.J. 384, 398 (1972) (characterizing Wheelabrator and Steinthal as ". . . a drastic, if not complete, retreat from
the judicial intervention made possible by Scanwell."); see Comment, The Role of GAO
and Courts in Government Contract "Bid Protests":An Analysis of Post-Scanwell Remedies, 1972 DUKE L.J. 745, 767-69.
30
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to the only private party with a sufficient interest to undertake
challenging an erroneous contract award are difficult to pinpoint.
The explanation articulated by the Lukens Court, that the procurement laws conferred no legally protected rights on private bidders,31 might derive from some perceived distinction between the
regulatory and proprietary activities of government. Under this
view, duties placed upon the government acting in a regulatory capacity may be owed to the regulated party, but those restricting
proprietary functions are for the government's internal control only.
The contractor deals with the government not as the sovereign, but
merely as another customer. According to the Court in Lukens,
when the government acts in a purely proprietary capacity, acquiring goods and services, it should be held only to the customary
standards of the business world, notwithstanding the existence of
laws imposing more rigorous restraints.3 2 The bidder should obtain no special advantages solely because the other party to the
transaction is the federal government.
This proprietary-regulatory distinction has been given substantive
effect in various contexts. Matters relating to public contracts are
specifically exempted from the rule-making provisions of the APA. 3
There is also some indication that the Act was never intended
to reach the government's proprietary activities in the first place. 4
On the other hand, commentators have suggested that restrictions
on agency activity should be given the same force and effect no matter which the capacity. For example, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
interprets Supreme Court decisions after Lukens as establishing that
the federal government "does not enjoy 'unrestricted power' in its
contractual relations; the government is still the government even
when it acts in a proprietary capacity .... "" And four years before the District of Columbia Circuit decided Scanwell, Judge Leventhal of that court stressed the similarities between federal regula31 "[The statute regulating procurement] requires for the Government's benefit that
its contracts be made after public advertising. It was not enacted for the protection of
sellers and confers no enforceable rights upon prospective bidders. . . .The duty [imposed upon contracting officers] is owing to the Government and to no one else." 310

U.S. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
32 "Like private individuals and businesses, the government enjoys the unrestricted
power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to
fixthe terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." Id. at 127.

3 APA § 4(a)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1970).
34 Pierson, supra note 10, at 13 n.67.
35 3 K. DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 22.04, at 219 (1958) (emphasis

added). As authority for this statement Davis cites United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947), which dealt with the constitutional rights of federal employees.
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tory programs and procurement activities, and argued for increased
application of administrative law concepts in the procurement area."6
But the fact that these scholars advocate minimizing the difference
in treatment demonstrates that a distinction is well embedded in
7
judicial thinking.
While this proprietary activity concept was significant enough
to furnish a theoretical justification for barring bidders' suits at
the time of Lukens, the commentators cited indicate its importance
is waning. There is a growing recognition that an individual has
a right to expect fair treatment when he deals with his government
in any capacity. 8 But some of the more pragmatic reasons for the
Lukens barrier to judicial intervention live on. These are considerations of public policy that can be broken down into two principal
interests: (1) the need for broad contracting officer discretion in
the selection of a bidder and (2) the need for the procurement
function to operate unobstructed by judicial interference. The latter
is particularly compelling in military procurements, where the delays attendant to protracted litigation may jeopardize some program
vital to the national defense. Both of these public interests were
advanced by the Supreme Court in Lukens39 and have played a
prominent role in the subsequent development of the law.40
Notwithstanding the vitality of these interests, it is doubtful
that they are of sufficient weight to warrant treating procurement
as distinct from all other administrative decisionmaking, traditionally reviewable for abuse of discretion, and shielding it completely
This decision is narrower than the proposition for which it is cited.

While there

may be no difference between proprietary and regulatory functions for the purposes of
constitutional restrictions on governmental power, the distinction may continue to
have import for others.

86 Leventhal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 35 (1966).
Judge Leventhal authored the majority opinions in many of the recent procurement
decisions by the District of Columbia court, including M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,
455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
37 Even the strongest proponents of limiting governmental powers have seen some

special feature in proprietary activities. Charles Reich, in arguing for increased protection of individual rights to government largess, conceded that "Government contracts might seem the best possible example of a type of valuable which no one has
any right to receive, and which represents only the government's managerial function."
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 743 (1964).
38
See notes 117-26 infra & accompanying text.
39 310 U.S. at 127 (government discretion); id. at 130-31 (unhindered procure-

ment).
40

See, e.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The protection of these two public interests by the court in Steinthal is discussed at
notes 172-77 infra & accompanying text.
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from judicial scrutiny. A certain sense of exigency may exist where,
for example, the Defense Department is attempting to obtain weaponry for immediate use in Vietnam, 4' a situation that weighs in favor of giving a wide berth to the procuring agency. This factor is
absent, though, in the vast majority of procurements where the government is purchasing more mundane commodities, such as ballpoint
pens' or air conditioning.43 But the legacy of Lukens appears to be
a blanket reluctance to risk judicial involvement in any procurement
activity. Although in many instances the courts could enforce the
bidder's private interests without sacrificing the interests of the
general public, the Supreme Court in Lukens was unwilling to take
the chance. The prospect of judges halting urgent procurement to
second guess the judgment of the contracting officer proved too great
to permit recognition of enforceable rights in the bidder.
A major analytical problem with the Lukens decision is the
Court's technique of treating these various considerations under the
one rubric of standing. Instead of segmenting the problem into
issues of reviewability, scope of review, and propriety of remedy,
the Courth invoked the one holding "bidders lack standing" to deal
with the myriad of policies for keeping the bidder out of court.
This fusion of distinct doctrines of administrative law" had two undesirable consequences. First, for thirty years, it foreclosed separate consideration of the individual public and private interests at
stake in each particular case by imposing an across-the-board barrier
to any bidder's challenge. Then, once Scanwell was decided, because these various concerns had previously been amalgamated un41

Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974
(1972).
42
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 950 (1971).
43 Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
44
This problem of confusing and obscuring separate questions of administrative law
was discussed by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159, 176 (1970):
[I] njury in fact, reviewability, and the merits pose questions that are largely
distinct from one another, each governed by its own considerations. To fail
to isolate and treat each inquiry independently of the other two, so far as possible, is to risk what is at issue in a given case, and thus to risk uniformed,
poorly reasoned decisions that may result in injustice. Too often these various questions have been merged into one confused inquiry, lumped under
the general rubric of "standing." The books are full of opinions that dismiss a plaintiff for lack of "standing" when dismissal, if proper at all, actually
rested upon the plaintiff's failure to prove on the merits the existence of the
legally protected interest that he claimed, or on his failure to prove that the
challenged agency action was reviewable at his instance.
(foomotes omitted).
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der a single heading, the courts faced difficulties in delineating the
interests that merited protection in a given case.
Properly viewed, the real issue in Lukens was not one of standing
at all. It was more akin to justiciability or its administrative law
counterpart, reviewability. The correct focus of standing, as the
Supreme Court has recently pointed out, goes not to the merits of
the issue being adjudicated but to whether the litigant is the proper
party to adjudicate it.45 This question in turn depends on whether
he has alleged a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that the litigation will possess concrete adverseness and vigorous advocacy.46 The question decided in Lukens was
not the propriety of the individual litigants. It went beyond the
particular parties to whether the restrictions on contract awards were
to be accorded any legally binding effect enforceable against the
contracting officer, or, as the Court posed the issue, whether the
duties created by the procurement laws are owed to any one other
than the government.4" The resolution of these issues has nothing
to do with the personal stake of the party bringing the suit.4 8
The Supreme Court's readiness to treat the entire problem in
terms of standing is understandable for 1940. At that time, six years
before the enactment of the APA, the only way to challenge administrative action successfully was to prove that it invaded a personal "legal right." Under the Court's opinion in Tennessee Electric
45 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
46 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
47 See note 31 supra. If the duties were established for the benefit of the government only, private citizens would be precluded from enforcing them against the government. This does not mean, however, that the procurement restrictions would have
no substantive effect whatsoever. They could still be asserted by the government by
way of defense. This phenomenon occurs when the government cancels an existing
contract and the contractor sues for damages. If the government can show that the
award was for some reason invalid, then the contract is void, and the contractor's remedy is limited to quantum meruit for the fair value of goods and services received
and used by the government. Schoenbrod v. United States, 410 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl.
1969) (violation of FPR requirements that price quotations be solicited from eligible offerors); Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (bid failed
to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation).
48 One commentator has recently contended, however, that the standing doctrine
serves important purposes beyond the adversity of interests rationale articulated in Flast
and Baker v. Car'. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A FunctionalAnalysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973). He labels these additional considerations as (1) access
standing, focusing on whether the nature and extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff
are such as to warrant the expenditure of scarce judicial resources on deciding his case,
id. at 670; and (2) decision standing, dealing with the allocation of policy-making responsibility among the three branches, id. at 683. The author believes that Lukens
came under the second rationale: the Court denied standing because it was unwilling to
interfere with the executive branch in administering war-related production. Id. at 685.
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Power Co. v. TVA, 49 the questions of standing and a legal right
on the merits were coextensive. Unless the injured litigant possessed some right existing under common law or one "founded on a
statute which confers a privilege," he had no standing to contest the
invasion. 50 The Lukens Court's conclusion that the procurement
statutes were not intended to confer a cause of action upon private bidders disposed of all the relevant questions at once. It was
not until this somewhat theoretical view of the nature of administrative authority had been replaced by the more practical approach
of the APA, and the law of standing had been liberalized, that the
distinction between standing and the merits became significant.
It was this liberalization that spawned the Scanwell court's "solution" to bidders' suits. In approaching the problem its reasoning
must have been as follows: (1) Lukens provides the obstacle to
bidders' securing judicial review of procurement decisions; (2) Lukens is phrased in terms of "bidders lack standing"; (3) therefore
find some way to provide bidders standing and the Lukens doctrine
will be overcome. But as has just been discussed, Lukens stood for
a good deal more than no standing to sue. Instead of investigating
the viability of the "no privately enforceable rights against the government" dimension of the Lukens decision, the Scanwell court
found standing in spite of it. The problem with this collateral ap49 306 U.S. 118 (1939).

5od. at 137-38. Certainly in establishing agency authority Congress could create
legal rights for the parties involved, the invasion of which would give them standing.
S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). But under the Tennessee Electric reasoning, unless
it clearly did so, statutory restrictions on agency authority were not enforceable by
private parties. The theoretical support for this doctrine is best explained by judge
Frank in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as soot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943). In his view, the sole effect of congressional grants of authority to agencies
was to displace duties existing at common law. The authorizing statute established a
zone of privilege, wiping out old legal rights within its perimeters, but creating no new
ones. The only way the scope of authority or discretion would come into issue is if
the administrative officer were sued for invading some common law right and asserted
his authorization as a defense. Id. at 700. Thus, unless the litigant relied upon some
common law right, he had no basis for challenging the agency action.
Judge Frank's explanation of the theoretical principles governing the right to challenge administrative action appears to represent the view possessed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a
sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts. Or standing may be based on an interest created by the
Constitution or a statute. But if no comparable common-law right exists and
no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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proach to Lukens is that once bidders get into court under Scanwell
there may be nothing for them to enforce. The policies that led the
Lukens court to erect the standing barrier may now halt bidders on
the merits.
The technique used by the District of Columbia Circuit to circumvent Lukens was twofold. First, the court relied upon cases
decided in the early 1940's for the proposition that private litigants
could secure standing without private legal rights when they sue
to vindicate the public interest." They function as "private attorneys general" and therefore need no legally protected interest of
their own. The Scanwell court held the plaintiff-bidder possessed
standing as representative of the public's interest in forcing contracting officers to comply with the procurement statutes and regulations.52 Second, the court found a direct authorization for the
plaintiff's standing in the language of the APA; 53 it construed the
Act to grant standing to anyone suffering injury in fact as a result
of agency action.5 4 The economic injury sustained by the bidder in
losing a contract to a competitor clearly satisfied this requirement.
51 Judge Tamm, writing for the court in Scanweli, discussed at length the historical development of the law of standing. The first departure from the Tennessee Electric
doctrine came in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). In Sanders the Court upheld the plaintiff's standing even though it lacked a legal right, since
Congress had made a specific grant of standing under the Communications Act. Next
came the cases of Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) and Associated
Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), articulating the theory of the private attorney general.
52 424 F.2d at 864.
53 APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof."
The uncodified version of the Act contained slightly different language: "Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to
judicial review thereof." APA § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946).
54 424 F.2d at 870-73. The court in Scanwell noted that the Supreme Court had not
yet chosen to read the Act to confer standing upon any person adversely affected by
the action of an agency, but it decided nonetheless that its interpretation of the Act
was the correct one. Id. at 872. One month later the Supreme Court once again rejected the opportunity to hold that injury in fact was the only requirement for standing
under the APA. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp., 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). For a discussion of Scanwell standing in light of these cases see notes 77-95 infra & accompanying text. It
appears, however, that the view of the court in Scanwell is probably the correct one. Professor Davis makes a compelling argument, based on the legislative history of the APA,
that the Act was intended to give standing to all those aggrieved in fact. Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 465-68 (1970). Professor Scott,
on the other hand, believes that Davis's legislative history argument is too weak to support the "revolution" in administrative law that would result if all individuals injured
in fact were given standing to sue. Scott, supra note 48, at 658-59.

LEGAL RIGHTS OF BIDDERS

1973]

By thus invoking a liberal construction of the APA, bolstered by
the fiction of a private attorney general enforcing a public cause
of action, Scanwell got the disappointed bidder into the federal
courts.

55

B. Is Something More Than Scanwell Standing Necessary?
Since early 1970, the law in the District of Columbia Circuit has
been that bidders have standing.5 The question then is whether
this standing under Scanwell is enough to secure adequately the interests of the bidder. If the 'bidder now enjoys a sufficient enforceable interest to set aside an unlawful contract award, it is unnecessary to consider whether his interest amounts to a "personal legal
right" in the traditional Tennessee Electric sense. On the other
hand, if the bidder needs something more than Scanwell standing
to obtain relief against the government, the Lukens holding that bidders have no enforceable rights of their own must be confronted
directly.
In broader compass, the issue is the extent to which the recently
developed law of judicial review of administrative action has rendered the traditional concept of a legal right obsolete. In effect,
a bidder's interest vis-a-vis the contracting officer may indeed amount
to an enforceable right. The contracting officer is under certain
enumerated duties in the making of awards. Under Scanwell and
55 In its subsequent opinion in Steinthal, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted Scanwell as grounding standing on "two interrelated principles": (1) the judicial review provisions of section 10(a) of the APA and (2) the notion of a "private attorney general." 455 F.2d at 1291 n.2. It seems more proper to characterize the
Scanwell decision as holding that section 10(a) explicitly gives the plaintiff standing to sue, while the private attorney general theory provides the policy rationale for
Congress's allowing him to do so. Clearly Congress has the power, subject to certain
constitutional limitations discussed at note 64 infra, to grant standing to any litigant it
chooses. This was the import of FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940), discussed at note 51 supra.
56 Soon after it decided Scanwell, the District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its
holding and applied it in slightly different contexts. Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433
F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433
P.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Scanwell the plaintiff was the second lowest bidder
contesting the award to the lowest bidder on the ground that the latter's bid was nonresponsive to the invitation. Ballerinainvolved a potential supplier challenging the government's decision to exempt pen procurements from the requirements of competitive
bidding so that pens could be procured from National Industries for the Blind. And in
the Blackhawk case the plaintiff, low bidder for the jov, was declared ineligible for the
award because he failed to qualify as a responsible contractor. In both these cases the
plaintiffs had standing on the basis of Scanwell. Since these initial decisions, the District of Columbia courts have consistently held that a bidder on government contracts
has standing under the APA. E.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289,
1291 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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the APA, the bidder possesses a sufficient relationship to the contracting officer to sue for violations of those duties when he stands
to be injured. In Hohfeldian terminology this capacity to sue to
enforce the duty gives the bidder the jural correlative of a duty a right.57 The bidder and the contracting officer stand in a rightduty jural relation. This analysis assumes, however, that the APA
grant of standing to seek judicial review also provides the litigant
with what amounts to a cause of action against the government on
the merits. And this assumption may be unwarranted.5 8 Throughout the discussion that follows the term "traditional right" will be
used to designate a legal right in the customary sense, a benefit or
protection existing at common law or created by Congress for the
purpose of securing the interests of the class of persons protected.
In contrast to the traditional right, there exists the expanded conception of an enforceable interest created by the APA, a duty placed
upon an administrative official plus standing in some individual to
seek judicial review of alleged violations of that duty. This will
be referred to as an "incidental right," because protection of the
interests of the individual plaintiff may be incidental to the purpose
for establishing the administrative duty.
The Scanwell decision held that bidders possess incidental rights
against the government. Two questions follow. First, is the standing granted to bidders in Scanwell valid in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the APA? Second, if Scanwell is correct on the question of standing, do the bidder's incidental rights
entitle him to prevail on the merits if he can prove the award was
unlawfully made, or must he still possess a traditional substantive
right of his own? To answer these questions it is necessary to assess
the present state of the law of standing to challenge administrative
action.
1. The CurrentLaw of Standing
Notwithstanding six major Supreme Court opinions on the subject in the last five years,5 9 the law of standing to seek judicial review
57

See Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-

ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-32 (1913).
58 See notes 96-109 infra & accompanying text.
59
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of agency action in the federal courts remains an intricate problem. "
Association of Data Processing Set-vice Organizatioms V. Camp contains the most recent enumeration of the requirements for standing
under section 10(a) of the APA.6' The Court explicitly rejected
the idea that a traditional right is the prerequisite for standing; it
stated that the legal interest test of Tennessee Electric "goes to the
merits." 62 Under Data Processing, the plaintiff has standing when
(1) the action challenged caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise; 63 (2) the interest he seeks to protect is "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question;""M and (3) judicial review of
the decision challenged is not precluded by Congress., 5
The Data Processing decision is also significant from the standpoint of the standing tests the Court chose not to adopt. It refused
to make injury in fact the only criterion, an approach advocated by
many. Professor Davis, for example, has long argued that any person suffering substantial injury as a result of administrative action
60
See Davis, supra note 54, at 450: "The law of standing, which the Supreme Court
has called a 'complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction,' has long been too complex;
and the recent developments have increased the complexity rather than reducing it."
61 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See note 53 supra.
62 397 U.S. at 153.
63 Id. at 152. It is open to question whether this part of the standing test is necessary to fulfill the case or controversy requirement of article I1. U.S. CONST. art.
IlI, § 2, cd. 1. Both Mr. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, 397 U.S. at 153, and
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in result, id. at 176-77, appear to believe that the injury
in fact requirement is of constitutional dimension. One noted commentator, on the
other hand, has thought it not constitutionally necessary that the plaintiff have a personal interest. L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE AcrioN 517

(1965).

See generally Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74

L. REV. 1265 (1961). After reviewing both sides of the issue, Professor Scott
concludes there is considerable support for the proposition that "some minimum personal interest" is required by the Constitution. Scott, supra note 48, at 657-58.
64 397 U.S. at 153. The Court implies that this standard is necessary to satisfy the
section 10(a) requirement that the plaintiff be "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." Id.
651d. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970), provides in part: "This chapter applies
except to the extent that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Thus any right to review and therefore any congressional grant of standing under the Act is made subject to these two exceptions.
In view of the healthy presumption in favor of judicial review, this third branch of
the Data Processing test is not likely to pose a serious obstacle to judicial scrutiny. In
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), the Court stated that "...
judicial review of final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." More recently the Court has held that the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine is a very
narrow exception and will not preclude review unless there is "no law to apply."
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
HARV.
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should possess the requisite standing to challenge it.6" Mr. Justice
Brennan adopts this position in his separate opinion in DataProcessing and Barlow.' As he points out, denying standing to an individual palpably injured, because the interest he asserts falls outside
the statutory zone, is inconsistent with the Court's earlier holding
in Flast v. Cohen.6 8 In Flast, a suit by federal taxpayers contesting
the constitutionality of a federal spending program, the Court implied that the standing requirement was satisfied whenever the plaintiff alleged a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy to
guarantee the concrete adverseness required by article 111.69 Requiring that the litigant suffer substantial injury as a result of the challenged governmental action assures this personal stake. Whether
the litigant bases his challenge on the validity of the authorizing
statute as in Flast or the validity of the agency action taken pursuant to it as in Data Processing," injury in fact should be the sole
criterion for standing. The Court in Data Processing, however, refused to go this far. The "zone of interests" test it imposed represents a middle ground between granting standing to every party aggrieved in fact and requiring a traditional legal right.7
Another approach to standing which the Court could have followed in Data Processing is Professor Jaffe's scheme of characterizing suits against administrative agencies as public actions or private
The former category comprises actions typically brought by
ones.
taxpayers, consumers, or citizens where the interests of the named
plaintiff are affected no differently from those of the public at
large.1 3 Data Processing and Scanwell, on the other hand, qualify
66 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 35, § 22.02; see note 54 supra.
67 397 U.S. at 170-72.
68 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
69 Id. at 99-101.
70
This is not to say that the considerations present in providing judicial review over
administrative action do not differ from those involved in determining the constitutional
validity of a statute on its face. But the differences should be treated under the appropriate doctrines of administrative law, such as reviewability or scope of review, instead
of being lumped together under the rubric of standing. See Davis, supra note 54, at
469.
71 In its application the "zone of interests" test may not depart significantly from a
pure injury in fact standard. Professor Scott believes that under Data Processing and
Barlow v. Collins a mere congressional awareness of the plaintiff's interests might be
sufficient to satisfy it. Moreover, he interprets the Court's recent decisions in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), and Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400
U.S. 45 (1970), as weakening the test further, to permit standing wherever the statute
relied upon has an identifiable protective effect. Scott, supra note 48, at 663-66.
7
2See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 63, at 459-545.
73 Id. at 460. Examples of public actions include Flast and Sierra Club v. Morton,
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as private actions. The plaintiffs there were damaged in some appreciable and particular fashion, apart from the harm suffered by the
public in general; to use Professor Jaffe's label, they are Hohfeldian plaintiffs7 4
This conceptual framework allows for a three-tier classification
of challenges to government action. Type I represents the classic
form of civil action. The litigant asserts a legally protected private
interest, a traditional right, the invasion of which has caused him
individual harm. An example is United Public Workers v. Mitchell,75 where a federal employee contended that the government
violated his constitutionally protected right to engage in political
activities. In a Type II action, for example, the bidder's suit as
viewed by the Scanwell court, the right enforced is the public's, but
the plaintiff has a particular personal stake in the outcome. Though
only the public interest is accorded legal protection, the private
plaintiff enforcing it is still Hohfeldian. The Type III suit is Flast,
Professor Jaffe's public action.
No standing problem exists as to the Type I plaintiff; his personal legal right satisfies even the Tennessee Electric criteria. In
the other two classes, however, the theory of the cause of action is
that it is the public's right being enforced. If any distinction is to
be recognized between the standing requirements for private litigants in the two classes, the restrictions on the Type III plaintiff
should be the more rigorous. Adequate representation of the public
interest is more assured in the Type II situation, where the plaintiff
is Hohfeldian, with a stake in the outcome comparable to that of the
litigants in the traditional private lawsuit. The standing cases decided to date, however, have not chosen to recognize such a distinction.76
405 U.S. 727 (1972), where the dub brought suit as representative of the public to
enjoin official approval of a proposed skiing development alleging the development was
detrimental to aesthetic and ecological interests. The Court held the club lacked standing since it failed to allege that it would itself suffer injury if the project were approved.
Id. at 734-35.
7
4 Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L REv. 1033, 1033-36 (1968); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
117-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 330 U.S. 75 (1947), discussed at note 35 supra.
76
Although the public-action private-action dichotomy has been discussed by the
Court, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972), it has never been
made the basis for granting or denying standing. Instead the Type III plaintiff's standing has turned on whether he alleged a sufficient personal stake as in Flast or injury in
fact under the APA as in Sierra Club.
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Ramifications for Bidders' Suits

The questions remaining after Scanwell and Data Processing
disclose a need to determine whether a 'bidder possesses traditional
legal rights against the government. First, in view of the Data Processing decision, the Scanwell court may have been overly ambitious
in granting standing to bidders under the APA. Second, even if a
bidder now has standing and incidental rights, this interest may
not be enough to provide him with a cause of action against the
government on the merits.
a. Bidder's Standing Under Data Processing.- The Scanwell
court correctly anticipated the first and the third parts of the test
7" It
for standing established one month later in Data Processing.
found no preclusion of judicial review either by congressional mandate78 or under the doctrine of nonreviewable administrative discretion.7 9 And throughout its opinion the court emphasized that
Scanwell had suffered injury in fact by losing the contract to a competitor."0 Only in regard to the "zone of interests" requirement of
Data Processing was the court's analysis in Scanwell deficient.
The court of appeals believed that injury in fact should be the
sole requirement for standing under the APA.81 Because the bidder served as a private attorney general representing the general
public interest, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether
his individual interests were protected as well.
Decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit after Data Processing attempted to integrate the Supreme Court's standards into
the Scanwell test.8 2 But a dose reading of these opinions indicates
77
Scanwell was decided on February 13, 1970; Data Processing, on March 3. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision, the government petitioned for a rehearing in
Scanwell. This petition was denied on May 7. 424 F.2d at 859.

781d. at 865-66.
791d. at 874-75.
80 E.g., id. at 872. The economic injury resulting from the loss of potential business has been consistently recognized as sufficient to make the plaintiff "aggrieved in
fact." E.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
81 424 F.2d at 872.
The court admitted that no decision of the Supreme Court
had yet authorized standing for every party aggrieved in fact, but felt such a result
was the clear intent of the APA. Id.
82 Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 950 (1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). In Ballerina, the court held that the bidder had standing if (1) the challenged action caused him injury in fact; (2) there was no clear and convincing indication
of legislative intent to withhold review; and (3) "the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of its statutory authority, so as to injure an interest that 'is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'" 433 F.2d at 1207.
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that the "arguably within" test was not rigidly applied; the court
appears to presume that the requirement is met whenever a prima
fade showing of arbitrariness is made. 3 Commentators suggested
that the court of appeals was too lax in applying Data Processing
to the bidders,8 4 and in a subsequent opinion the court admitted
that some of its earlier decisions had allowed injury in fact to suffice for standing. 5
The next attempt to forge an acceptable basis for bidder's standing was made by the Third Circuit in Merriam v. Kunzig.8 Although truer to the standards of Data Processing, the court's approach was basically the same as that taken in Scanwell. The suit
concerned a lease for office space awarded by the General Services
Administration (GSA). The plaintiff, owner of an existing office
building, alleged that by leasing a building to be constructed in the
future the GSA violated restrictions contained in its annual appropriations.8 7 The district court dismissed for lack of standing.,
It
determined that because the sole purpose of the restrictions was to
economize on federal spending, the interest asserted by the plaintiff
failed to come within the protected zone.8 9
The Third Circuit reversed. Its treatment of the standing issue
is somewhat confusing. First, the court cited Scanwell and Sierra
Club v. Morton ° to establish that a private plaintiff may assert the
public's interest and implied that, inasmuch as these public interests
are within the statutory zone, the plaintiff should have standing 1
83Under Professor Scott's interpretation of the post-Data Processing standing
decisions, this may be enough to satisfy the "zone of interests" test. See note 71 supra.
Clearly a statute that prohibits administrative arbitrariness injurious to the bidder has
the protective effect he deems as sufficient.
8
4 See, e.g., Pierson, supra note 10, at 21-22.
85 Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
86 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1973).
87
See, e.g., Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1963, Pub. L. No. 87-741, tit.
I, 76 Stat 728 (1962).
88347 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
89 Id. at 721.
90 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
91 On this point the court stated:
Merriam meets the standing test adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit. Assuming for the moment, as the Government contends, that both the
Independent Offices Appropriations Act and the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972 were designed to protect no zone of interest within which he
falls, Merriam may nevertheless assert the public interest provided he has suffered injury in fact.
476 F.2d at 1241.
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The court then went on to determine that the plaintiff's private interests were within the zone as well. To do so, it impliedly rejected
Lukens and held that the ASPA and FPASA are intended to secure
not only the interests of the government but also the interests of
those who offer to do business with it. 2 To support this holding,
the court pointed out that the GAO has consistently acknowledged
the bidder to be inside the zone.13 This conclusion is troublesome.
The fact that the GAO, to foster sound procurement policy, hears
a bidder's contention that a particular award is invalid does not
necessarily imply the GAO views the bidder as an intended beneficiary of the procurement statutes. The office may merely believe
that the bidder's protest is a worthwhile mechanism for exposing
unlawful contracts. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit in Merriam was
of the opinion that the zone of congressionally protected interests
should be measured by the scope of the GAO's protest review?9
A question raised by Merriam, which had not previously arisen
in the District of Columbia line of cases, was which statute should
determine the zone. The district court had thought it was the Independent Offices Appropriations Act (IOAA). The Third Circuit
correctly held it was the FPASA, which prohibits the acceptance of
a bid that does not conform to the invitation. 5 Because the plaintiff's status as a bidder is the basis for his standing, the inquiry
whether his interests are protected must focus on the statutes regulating the bidding process. Statutes restricting government purchasing, such as the IOAA, benefit him only as they are embodied
in the rules governing permissible awards.
Whether or not the Third Circuit correctly defined the protected
zone, the Merriam approach is the one courts will have to follow if
they are to satisfy Data Processing.95a They must find some congres92Id. at 1242.
93 Id. at 1242-43.
94 The GAO permits an interim bid protest to be filed by any "interested party."
4 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1973).
95 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1970).
95
a The defendant's subsequent petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the
Third Circuit over a dissent by Judge Adams. The approach he took is rather interesting. He reasoned it was not sufficient to hold that the plaintiff had standing, since,
in view of cases like Flast, this may mean only that he suffered injury in fact, and therefore might not possess a sufficient interest to meet the standards of Data Processing.
According to Judge Adams, the court must additionally determine that Congress intended to protect the interests of the litigant - in essence, intended to supply him with a
cause of action to redress the injuries he received. He believed that the majority had
not made a sufficient inquiry into the purposes and legislative history of the statute
and had permitted the plaintiff judicial review upon determining only that the statute
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sional purpose to protect the economic interests of bidders. In the
face of Lukens this is no easy task. The Data Processing test is a
useful one where Congress fashions restrictions on agency authority
in an effort to strike an equitable balance among the interests of
various classes. In these situations no single group predominates
as the focal point of congressional concern; instead, the interests
of say, business, labor, and consumers are all arguably protected.
Procurement, however, does not fit this mold. Under Lukens the
procurement statutes evince no intent to protect the interests of bidders. So long as this holding survives, the economic interests of a
bidder cannot be included within the Data Processing zone. Thus,
the Scanwell ploy to circumvent Lukens was futile. The only way
to secure standing for bidders under the APA is to overrule the
Lukens decision directly.
b. Prevailing on the Merits.- There is language .in the Data
Processingopinion to imply that, although a litigant no longer needs
a traditional right to have standing, such a right is still necessary
to succeed on the merits. At one point the majority opinion comments that the legal interest test of Tennessee Electric "goes to the
merits,"9 6 and later it adds, "[whether the relevant Acts give] petitioners a 'legal interest' that protects them against violations of these
Acts, and whether the actions of respondents did in fact violate
either of those Acts, are questions which go to the merits and remain
to be decided below."9 7 Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, also suggests that the invasion of a legally protected interest
is necessary to recover on the merits. 8
In subsequent cases, the government has argued that Data Processing requires something akin to a traditional right before a
plaintiff challenging administrative action can obtain relief on the
had a protective effect. 476 F.2d at 1248-49. He contrasted this approach with that
of the District of Columbia Circuit which, he contended, granted standing "only after
examining the legislative history and purpose of the relevant statutes involved in each
case," citing Constructores,Ballerina,and Scanwell. 476 F.2d 1249 n.27. This choice
of examples is puzzling, since it is these decisions that have been criticized as overly lax
in applying the zone of interests requirement. See notes 82-85 supra & accompanying
text.
96 397 U.S. at 153.
97 Id. at 158.
98
Justice Brennan points out that in Flast the court separated the question of standing from "whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the
defendant's action invaded." Id. at 171. His opinion goes on to discuss the proper
segregation of issues involved in a challenge to agency action and states that after resolving the questions of standing and reviewability a court should proceed to the merits,
to "whether the specific legal interest daimed by the plaintiff is protected by the statute
and to whether the protested agency action invaded that interest." Id. at 175.
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merits. 9 Raising this contention in bidder's suits, the procuring
agency succeeded in one case,' 00 but lost in another, Lombard Corp.
v. Resor.1' 1 In Lombard, the district court dismissed the government's contention by observing that it would be anomalous to grant
the plaintiff standing and then to effectively revoke it by holding
that he lacks a legally protected interest. 1 2 This answer ignores
the separate nature of the two inquiries. Standing is a threshold
question, going to the court's judicial power under article III and
its specific jurisdiction under the APA. To overcome this initial
hurdle to review, a litigant need not make the same showing as that
required to prevail once the case has been fully adjudicated. 0 3
It is unlikely that the government's position will ultimately prevail. While the Supreme Court has not confronted the question
directly, dictum in Sierra Club v. Morton14 indicates that the Court
does not view a traditional right as necessary to prevail on the
merits. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, read the private attorney general line of cases-1 4a as requiring some sort of personal economic interest before the plaintiff can get into court. But
once he has standing, and judicial review is otherwise proper, he can
assert the rights of the public in support of his claims.'0 5 Under
this analysis, the legal interest problem becomes a question of jus
tertii: whether the private plaintiff will be allowed to raise the rights
99

This assertion was among the grounds advanced by the government in its petition
for rehearing in Scanwell. See note 77 supra. It argued that because the plaintiff did
not possess a legal right, its claim must be rejected on the merits. Appellee's Petition for
Rehearing at 3, Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
100 Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473, 477 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
101 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970).
102 Id.at 692.
103 An analogous situation is presented by Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
The plaintiff in Bell sought federal jurisdiction over his claims for damages resulting
from violations of his constitutional rights as a case "arising under" the laws of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Determining that the plaintiff failed to state
a cause of action, the district court dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to allege a cause of action to secure "federal
question' jurisdiction and reversed, stating:
... failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits
and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law
and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court
has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
327 U.S. at 682.
104 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
1 04
a Justice Stewart cited, inter alia, Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S.
4 (1942) and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), 405 U.S.
at 736-37. These authorities are discussed at note 51 supra & accompanying text.
105 Id.at 737 & n.12.
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of a third party or the general public. 06 And the private attorney
general doctrine provides a sufficient reason for authorizing the
plaintiff to litigate the public's rights. As a result, he can obtain
relief without a traditional private right of his own.'
This result would also seem mandated by the APA. By making
judicial remedies widely available to those injured by administrative arbitrariness, the Act replaced the narrow "zone of privilege"
view of agency authority described by Judge Frank.10 8 The Act
authorizes the courts to set aside unlawful agency action regardless
of whether that action cuts into an area of private legal rights.
The only restriction on individuals who can obtain this relief is the
aggrieved person provision in section 10(a),1 °9 which the Data
Processing Court held was satisfied whenever the litigant's interests
were arguably within the protected zone. Any plaintiff meeting
this criterion is entitled to the full scope of judicial remedies available under the Act. Nowhere in the APA is there imposed the
additional requirement of a traditional right.
The issues of standing and the merits are not the only reasons
for investigating whether a bidder should possess private traditional
rights. Even if courts in the future will be willing to (1)overrule Lukens, (2) find the bidder's interest within the zone of protection created by procurement laws, and (3) acknowledge that his
personal economic interests coupled with the interest of the general
public are sufficient to entitle the bidder to relief on the merits,
the question of traditional rights against the procuring authority
will remain an important one.
First, since the APA has no provision for monetary relief, the
liberalized incidental rights available under it are of no benefit to
bidders seeking damages. For them, a traditional right is still necessary. Second, the recognition of private legal rights is critical in fo106 For example, in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), a white defendant
was permitted to litigate the constitutional rights of a black in contesting the validity
of a restrictive convenant. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJos
Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
7
10 The Court's opinion in Sierra Club might be read narrowly to permit the plaintiff to raise the public's interest only as an additional factor to support his claim for injunctive relief. Under this view he would still have to establish a private cause of action before he could prevail. If, however, as the Court implies in Sierra Club, 405
U.S. at 737-38, the purpose of the plaintiff's standing in Data Processing-type cases is
to vindicate the public interest, it makes little sense to require that the plaintiff possess
a private cause of action of his own.

108 See note 50 supra.
109
See note 53 supra.
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cusing the court's attention on which interests, among the complex
of competing public and private considerations, should weigh most
heavily. The Scanwell decision was phrased in terms of enforcing
the public's interest in compliance with procurement laws."' But
the cases after Scanwell subordinated this interest to the competing
public concerns for broad discretion and unhindered procurement."'
Acknowledging that the bidder's personal interests warrant legal
protection for their own sake would limit this judicial tendency to
make net public welfare the sole test for judicial relief. For these
reasons it is necessary to determine whether bidders should possess
traditional rights against the government.
III.

THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A

BIDDER'S PURPOSEFUL RIGHTS

A.

Rationales for Enforcing a Bidder's Interests

The inquiry into whether bidders enjoy traditional legal rights
against the government must commence with the procurement statutes themselves. While Congress could have explicitly conferred
enforceable rights upon bidders, it did not do so. Nothing in
either the provisions of the ASPA or the FPASA or in their legislative history" 2 indicates whether Congress contemplated granting or
withholding legal rights to bidders."' These procurement statutes
established the primary obligations controlling the award of government contracts but created no remedial law to enforce them." 4
The task of developing remedies was left to subsequent legislation
or to the courts.
The principal source of legislative remedies for wrongful administrative action is the APA. It represents a general reservoir
of remedial law to complement the primary duties created by Congress in the individual agency statutes. The APA can thus supply
110 See note 52 supra & accompanying text.
111 This development is discussed at note 153

infra & accompanying text.
E.g., S. REP. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
113 Contrast this congressional reticence with the position taken by the Commission
on Government Procurement. The Commission was established in 1969 to make a
comprehensive study of procurement statutes, policies, regulations, and practices. Act
of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83 Stat. 269. In its final report, the Commission
stresses the value of judicial review of award protests and recommends that Congress
consider clarifying the statutory basis for court jurisdiction over bidders' suits. 4 PROCUREMENT REP., supra note 7, at 47-48.
114 This distinction between primary and remedial law is discussed in H. M. HART
& A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 487-89 (tent. ed. 1958).
112
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the bidder with an incidental right to enjoin the contracting officer
from exceeding his statutory authority or acting arbitrarily. Any
traditional right, however, will have to be judicially developed.
In determining whether a bidder's rights should be recognized
and enforced by the courts, the first place to look is the general statutory scheme Congress created to award contracts. One principal
index of congressional concern for securing the interests of private
bidders is the degree to which pure competitive bidding was incorporated into the system to bestow on each private businessman an
equal opportunity to vie for contract awards. It could be argued
that inasmuch as many procurements are exempted from competition, some other interests, such as the pubic's interest in efficient
acquisition of government supplies, predominates. Examples of
exemptions are all negotiated procurements, especially those made
pursuant to the ASPA provision that permits the government to
accept an initial proposal without first holding discussions with
other offerors.'1 5
These provisions indicate that Congress was frequently more impressed with fostering expeditious procurement than with guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of all bidders. They do not, however, warrant the conclusion that bidders have no legal rights under
the many other provisions which assist the bidder in competing for
an award. No single interest, public or private, is the polestar of
procurement law. The public concern for efficient procurement
often gives way to various social and economic nonprocurement objectives." 6 In fashioning the primary duties placed upon contracting officers Congress must balance these conflicting interests and determine which should be secured in a given situation. Thus the
individual interest in an opportunity to compete for contracts may
occasionally be outweighed by the public interest in procurement
efficiency. But in other situations, where Congress has mandated
that some competition must be employed, the private bidder should
be entitled to enforce the prevailing interest in effective competition.
Pervading the case law on administrative action is the idea that
when one deals with the government he has some essential right to
expect fair treatment in return, especially when he confers some
benefit upon the government in the process." 7 When the govern115 See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
6
11 See Grossbaum, ProceduralFairness in Public Contracts:The Procurement Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv. 171, 252-53 (1971).
117 In the context of bidders' suits the benefit conferred is the power to bind the
bidder to a contract. See Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1242 n.7 (3d Cir. 1973).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 559

ment sets out to use the advantages of the marketplace, it owes
businessmen the duty of fair and honest dealing." 8 This inherent
right to governmental fair play supplements the APA's blanket
prohibition of arbitrary, capricious, and illegal agency action." 9 Because this is a traditional legal right, it avoids the problems of standing and incidental rights encountered under the APA. The best
examples of this development with respect to potential government
contractors are two pre-Scanwell decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit on the issue of debarring a bidder from participating in future contract awards.2
The plaintiff in Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell sued to have declared unlawful
a Department of Labor regulation authorizing debarment for any
contractor who willfully violated the 8-hour laws. The court, in
testing the contractor's standing under the Tennessee Electric legal
right test, held that the company enjoyed a right "not to be invalidly denied equal opportunity under applicable law to seek contracts
on government projects."''
The District of Columbia Circuit subsequently held that this traditional right was invaded when debarment was imposed without
notice of the charges, hearings, or specific findings in Gonzalez v.
Freeman.' 2 Judge Burger, writing for the court in Gonzalez, emphasized that bidders have a legally protected right "not to be debarred except in an authorized and procedurally fair manner ... "123
He relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Greene v. McElroy12
for the proposition that this right to fair treatment could not be restricted without the most explicit legislative or executive authorization, and held that, under this standard, the debarment action lacked
118 Grossbaurm, supra note 116, at 237.

119 APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) provides in part:
The reviewing court shall (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; ....
120 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cit. 1964); Copper Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
121290 F.2d at 371.
122 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cit. 1964).
123 Id. at 576 (footnote omitted).
124 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959).
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sufficient procedural safeguards- 25 Cases like Gonzalez and Greene
v. McElroy mark the obsolescence of any right-privilege dichotomy
in classifying relationships with the government. 12 8 They establish
that the individual has some core right to administrative fair play,
over and above his constitutional right to procedural due process,
which can be retracted only by a dear and specific directive from
the legislature.
The case for recognizing a bidder's traditional right to be treated
fairly, in accordance with procurement statutes and regulations, is
intensified by the prospect of serious economic injury he stands to
suffer if denied the contract. He might stand to lose 35 million
dollars of business as did the bidder in General Electric Co. v. Seamans.'I 7 The Court in Lukens was correct in its statement that the
potential for economic loss alone does not create a legal right, but
the bidder's financial vulnerability cuts heavily in favor of permitting him to enforce whatever restrictions do exist on procurement action. 2 8
These two factors, a right to fair treatment by the government
and the prospect of serious economic harm, coalesce to create a substantial individual interest in the prospective contractor, necessitating
full legal protection. Furthermore, conferring traditional rights
upon bidders is warranted as a means of securing significant public
interests. This concept must be distinguished from the theory of
the private attorney general who lacks enforceable interests of his
own. His cause of action against the government emanates only
from his status as champion of the public's rights.
But the courts could further secure these public interests by
granting the private plaintiff rights and privileges of his own. This
does not require that the litigant's personal interest be the primary
125 334 F.2d at 579.
126 As Professor Speidel aptly put it, "As in other areas of governmental operations,
the reality of dependence [of business concerns upon government spending] has eroded

the traditional right-privilege distinction .... " Speidel, Judicial and Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 66 (1972).
See generally Reich, supra note 37; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
127 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 81,805 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1972), dismissed as moot,
18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 81,810 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 1972). The facts of this case are
discussed in 420 BNA FED. CoNT. REP. A-24 (1972).
128 Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 490 (1959).
In Gonzalez Judge Burger
suggested that the severity of economic injury was probably the dispositive factor in
Greene and might explain the difference between that decision and the Court's holding
in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 334 F.2d at 57980.
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focus of the court's concern. The law can confer a particular capacity 129 on a private litigant as a means of securing some public
interest or private interest of a third party. The litigant's self-interest will induce him to enforce the capacity conferred, thereby
assuring protection of the secured interest. An example is the
qualified privilege granted to those criticizing the official conduct
of a public officer in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 3 ' The
Court's emphasis in the Times case was on protecting the public's
interest in spirited and uninhibited commentary on public issues. 3 '
To safeguard this value the private publisher was granted a privilege which far exceeded the protection that his individual interests
13 2
alone deserved.
Two particular aspects of the public interest can be secured by
granting purposeful rights to the private bidder: (1) the interest
in vigorous competition among potential contractors and (2) the
interests embodied in contracting-out to private business in general.
In obtaining contract terms the government seeks the benefits of economic rivalry. When competition among bidders is conducted in
a fair and honest manner, with the broadest bidder participation
possible, the resulting contract should be the most favorable to the
government. 11 3 Any special advantages granted to one bidder or
129 This terminology is adopted from Dean Pound's theory of jurisprudence and
juristic relationships. Under his view the function of the law is to secure various interests, individual, public, and social. These interests are secured by conferring certain
capacities on private parties and public institutions. The capacities are the traditional
Hohfeldian relations: rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities,
and immunities and disabilities. See 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 101 (1959);
Hohfeld, supra note 57, at 30.
130 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
This privilege has since been extended to all matters of
public or general concern, at least those that somehow involve official actions by public
servants. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
131 For example, the Court stated, "[W]e consider this case against the background
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
376 U.S. at 270.
132 The Court in Times v. Sullivan believed the common law defense of truth was
insufficient to protect freedom of expression. Requiring a critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of his assertions may lead to self-censorship, for the critic will tend
to steer far wide of the unlawful zone. Id. at 279. For this reason the Court held
that a public official must prove "actual malice" - knowledge of the statement's falsity
or reckless disregard of whether it is false or not - to recover damages. Id. at 279-80.
This standard protects the publisher from liability for defamatory statements that he
would have known were untrue but for his own negligence. It is difficult to see how
any aspect of the publisher's individual interests could require this immunization of
negligent conduct. Consequently it must be the public's interest that mandates this
personal privilege.
133 Congress' policy in favor of full competition is codified throughout the procure-
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any departures from the regular statutory procedure detract from
the overall quality of the contract terms. And if the award procedure is dishonest, potential contractors will be deterred from venturing the sums necessary to prepare and submit bids.' 34 Because
the'benefit the government derives from competitive procurement
is dependent upon the integrity of the bidding process, bidders
should possess the interest necessary to insure their fair and impartial treatment. Recognizing the bidder's traditional rights will not
only enhance his faith in the rectitude of the process, but will also
assure that the proposal eventually selected is indeed the most advantageous to the government.
Granting a bidder's interest legal protection is also supported by
the contemporary character of the contracting-out relationship between private business and government. The present system of
procurement was not predestined. The view of the Supreme Court
in Lukens, that procurement was a purely proprietary function,
originating solely from the government's efforts to fulfill its needs
for goods and services in the most economical manner, begins one
step too late. It assumes there must be two distinct and closed
systems -

the government and private enterprise

-

engaging joint-

ly in commercial transactions to supply the government's requirements. But the government could have decided originally to manufacture materials, hire labor, and undertake research itself instead
of purchasing these commodities from the private sector. Any true
model of procurement must include the idea that contracting-out
manifests the conscious decision to have production and research
carried out by private industry and not by the government. 13' 5
Legal relationships in the procurement process should therefore be drawn to reflect the purposes for having governmental research and production performed by the private sector. It is possible that the system is nothing more than the most efficient means
of satisfying the government's needs. This was the unarticulated
premise in Lukens. But there are alternative explanations for conment statutes. For example, the formal advertising requirements of the ASPA, 10 U.S.C.
§ 2305(al (1970) provide in part: "The specifications and invitations for bids shall
pefmit such free and full competition as is consistent with the procurement of the property and services needed by the agency concerned."
134 See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412-13 (Ct. Cl. 1956),
discussed at notes 179-83 infra & accompanying text
135 Commentators have noted the growing use of contracting-out to accomplish such
functions as research, management, and decisionmaking. Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency of Federal Procurement Policies with other Governmental
Policies, 29 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 277, 287 (1964); Stove', The Government ContractSystem as a Problemin Public Policy, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 701, 707-10 (1964).
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tracting-out. One is that private business and labor leaders viewed
procurement as an opportunity for industry to share profits and risks
with the government, and that the present system developed through
their political support. 1 6 Under this theory, since the purpose of
the procurement laws is to benefit and protect private economic interests, private businessmen are clearly entitled to enforce them.
Another hypothesis is that contracting-out resulted from a policy
of decentralization, an attempt to limit the power and influence of
government by providing that many public functions be carried out
by private enterprise. In its implementation this policy has backfired. As private organizations do more and more of the public's
business, they become increasingly dependent upon the government
for their livelihoods and thus more vulnerable to its control. Contracting-out has enabled the government to exert control over practices of private industry that it would lack the power to regulate.
For example, the government can mandate the hiring practices. 7
and prescribe the labor conditions 88 to be implemented by the
businesses that seek to contract with it. It can direct the methods of
livestock slaughter 1 39 and prohibit the emission of air pollutants in
excess of certain state and federal standards. 14 0 As a practical
matter, many of these procurement restrictions, although limited by
their terms to persons employed in producing materials used in the
performance of government contracts, 141 may encompass a sufficient
number of employees to dictate the labor practices for an entire
firm and to set rates of compensation throughout its wage struc2
ture.14
136 See Stover, supra note 135, at 704-05.
137 Under authority of Exec. Order No. 11,246, the Department of Labor has issued
regulations requiring bidders on federally-assisted construction contracts to submit acceptable "affirmative action" programs for utilizing minority manpower. Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 418 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). One such regulation,
commonly referred to as the "Philadelphia Plan," was upheld in Contractors Ass'n v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
138 A series of federal statutes regulate the minimum wages, work hours, and overtime pay of laborers employed in the production of goods and services sold to the government. E.g., Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 27 6 a to 276a-5 (1970); Contract Work
Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (1970); Walsh-Healy Act, 41

U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
139 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-06 (1970).
Clean Air Act § 306, 42 U.S.C. § 1877h-4 (1970).
§ 1, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
14 2
See H. MERTON, PUBLIC CONTRACTS AND PRIVATE WAGES 103 (1965). Data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that in the 19 industries for which WalshHealey minimum wage determinations were issued during fiscal years 1961-64, over
65 percent of the total workers employed were covered by the Act. Id. at 92.
140

141 E.g., Walsh-Healy Act
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These statutory developments have shifted procurement from
a strictly proprietary function to a significant device for social and
economic regulation. A system originally created to restrict governmental power has become a vehicle for expanding it. As private enterprise becomes increasingly locked into the performance
of public functions and the attainment of national social and economic goals, the line between public and private fades. 143 If the
autonomy of these private enterprises is to be secured, they -mustbe
entitled to enforce their individual interests against the government.
'While Congress will still possess the legislative power to require
formally that those who contract with the United States implement
certain social and economic programs, granting legal protection to
the bidder should diminish the multifaceted collection of informal
pressures that the government can exert over the private businesses
that depend on it for their financial survival.'4 4 His economic interests secured by traditional rights, the bidder can then function
as an independent business entity operating out of economic selfinterest and can pose a check on the spreading governmental influence.
The current nonproprietary function of procurement as a tool
for implementing social and economic policies provides one further
rationale for protecting the bidder's interests. The Lukens view that
bidders were only the incidental beneficiaries of a system established
to assure expeditious supply acquisition is no longer tenable. Contemporary procurement is replete with instances where economic
efficiency is sacrificed in the interest of conferring special advantages upon a particular class of bidders. 45 Congress's desire to prefer one bidder over another is so significant that it overrides the
general policy of maximizing efficiency. 46 Examples include the
143 Miller & Pierson, supra note 135, at 287-91.
144The potency of these pressures is illustrated by the 1962 success of the Kennedy
administration in forcing the nation's largest steel corporations to rescind a price increase, partially because of the threat of losing government contracts. Reich cites this
incident to demonstrate how the independence of private business may be eroded by
what he terms "the public interest state." Reich, supra note 37, at 756.
145 See Grossbaum, supra note 116, at 252-53.
146 This phenomenon of placing social and economic policy above procurement efficiency is also apparent in the situations where the government refuses to deal with'
businesses that fail to adhere to certain social standards, as in the programs discussed at
notes 137-42 supra & accompanying text. Requiring all government contractors to implement various social programs increases the costs, and therefore, the price of government business and limits the number of firms from which the government may select.
As a result, procurement thrift is sacrificed. But the beneficiaries of these governmental
programs are not the bidders themselves, but the bidders' employees or the surrounding
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Buy American Act, 147 requiring the purchase of products made in
the United States whenever possible; the Small Business Act, 4 8 providing that certain awards be set aside for small business concerns;
and the section 8 (a) program, 149 authorizing the award of contracts
to the Small Business Administration to be subcontracted to minority-owned businesses.'
In structuring these programs the government has determined that the quantity of awards a particular group
would receive through the normal processes of competitive bidding
in insufficient, and because of some interest in the economic success
of these groups, has exempted them from the rigors of competition. Since the designated bidders were granted these award preferences for their own economic welfare, they possess the sort of
privilege conferred by statute which the Court in Tennessee Electric
recognized as a source of traditional rights in 1938. Accordingly
bidders should be entitled to enforce these advantages the government has conferred. 5 '
B.

The IncreasedJudicial Attention to Protecting
the Interests of the Bidder
1. Early Cases in the District of Columbia Circuit

The Scanwell decision produced a confusing rule for the district courts to follow. They were instructed to hear challenges to
procurement decisions brought by disappointed bidders, but were
cautioned that the bidder's only purpose in court was to vindicate
community. The present discussion is limited to the government's policy of restricting awards to a particular group of suppliers in an effort to bolster their economic welfare. Here the intended beneficiaries are the bidders.
147 41 U.S.C. § i0a-10d (1970).
148 5 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1970).
149 Small Business Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970).
150 This program was recently upheld over contentions: (1) that it infringed upon
the plaintiff's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, and (2) that the plaintiff had some statutory right to competitive bidding which was being violated. Ray
Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973).
151 The courts to date, in determining the biddefs standing and legal rights, have
not given substantive effect to the distinction between the tr:aditional sort of restrictions
on contract awards designed to assure economical procurement and the more recent sort
of restfictions created to attain some nonprocurement goal. Both have been treated
under the Lukens theory that procurement statutes are not enacted for the benefit of
the bidder, even though that theory appears clearly inapplicable to the latter class of
restrictions. But the courts have recognized the distinction in other contexts. For example, in Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 9 82,066 (D.C.
Cir. March 6, 1973), Judge Leventhal states that the difference should be taken into
account in assessing the contracting officer's discretion to treat the bidder's nonresponsiveness as immaterial. Id. at 87,281-82. This case is discussed at notes 204-09 infra
& accompanying text.
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the public interest. Because the court in Scanwell viewed the principal public interest as assuring compliance with the laws regulating
procurement, the salient public interest conveniently paralleled the
bidder's private interest in enjoying a fair opportunity to compete
foi the award by being treated in accordance with the statutes and
regulations. But under the Scanwell theory, the plaintiff-bidder was
only the windfall beneficiary of a public cause of action.
Commentators quickly recognized that the bidder's suit, though
characterized as a vehicle for enforcing a public interest, was in
reality a very private sort of litigation.'
The bidder's sole concerns were his personal economic desires. Nonetheless many trial
courts took the private attorney general fiction seriously and allowed an amorphous notion of the net public interest to be the
ultimate touchstone of whether the bidder should prevail on the
53
merits.1
Whether the public's total welfare will actually be benefitted by
allowing the bidder to litigate the validity of contract awards is
questionable. The central public concern is expeditious procurement, fulfilling the government's supply needs in the most efficient
manner. Once the contract has been awarded to an acceptable enterprise the public gains little from the cancellation and resolicitation required because the original award was technically improper.
Any benefit received by enhancing the attractiveness of the contract
terms is more than offset by the burdensome delay and expense of
protracted litigation and a second solicitation.'5 The public interest
Grossbaum, supra note 116, at 244-45; Pierson, supra note 10, at 14-15.
1'3 One example is Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970),
where the court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction upon determining that any benefits derived from enforcement by a private attorney general were
outweighed by the inconvenience and liabilities that the government would incur. In
National Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971), the court
admitted the contracting practices in question were "sloppy," but held that the plaintiff failed to show the "flagfant disregard for the regularity of contracting procedures
and other factors bearing on the public interest which would justify extraordinary
relief by way of injunction." Id. at 921.
154 An insight into the harmful delay the public may incur is provided by General
Elec. Co. v Seamans. Philco-Ford Corporation was awarded an Air Force contract for the
operation and maintenance of six remote satellite tracking stations. General Electric, which
had submitted a lower offer, filed a bid protest with the GAO in early 1972, and then
obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting Philco from taking any action to implement the award pending the GAO decision. 340 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972). Ultimately the GAO denied General Electric's protest, Dec. Comp. Gen. B-175004 (Oct.
12, 1972) (unpublished), and the District of Columbia Circuit permitted the injunction to lapse. 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 81,810 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 1972). This occurred, however, only after 11 months of litigation, during which the question of who
was to operate the stations was in doubt, and neither side was permitted to take any
part in managing them.
152
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is jeopardized further by the fact that the bidder is frequently suing
to compel the government to accept a more expensive contract.' 55
And cancelling a contract, even if required by a court order, may
subject the government to liability for the value of performance
rendered under the contract, including a reasonable allowance for
profits.' 56
What may result from opening the courtrooms to disappointed
bidders is illustrated by Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Construction Co, 157 Campbell involved a housing construction contract set aside for award to small businesses only. Lloyd Wood,
an indefatigable competitor for the contract, determined to challenge
the initial award proposal. Its first step was a protest to the Size Appeals Board of the Small Business Administration (SBA) to challenge the "small business" eligibility of the two firms that had submitted lower bids than its own. The Board disqualified the lowest
bidder but upheld the size status of Campbell, making Campbell
the lowest responsive bidder. Next, Lloyd Wood went to district
court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to reverse the size
determination and enjoin the award. The Air Force, apparently
unfazed by Lloyd Wood's valiant efforts to obtain the contract,
mailed a Notice of Award to Campbell. The district court then restrained the Air Force from executing a formal contract with Campbell, and in a subsequent opinion overturned the SBA size determination and held Campbell ineligible. 1 58 The court stated,
however, that it was without the necessary power to order the Air
155 Cf. Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432 (RD. Pa. 1971). A suit by one
bidder to cancel an existing award and compel acceptance of a higher bid was the very
situation presented by Scanwell.
15 6 See John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964). In Reiner the GAO ruled improper the award originally made to the plaintiff and the contract was cancelled. The Court of Claims held
that although the award might have been properly cancelled of withdrawn as a matter
of sound procurement policy, it was not so patently illegal as to render it a nullity.
Accordingly the cancellation was treated as a termination for the convenience of the government and the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages under the termination clause.
Reiner was a pire-Scanwell decision dealing with cancellation ordered by the GAO. The
Court of Claims believed the contractor should be entitled to recover for his performance
so long as the award evinced a minimal measure of legality. Still open to question is
whether this test is coextensive with the Steinthal "rational basis" standard for court
ordered cancellation. See note 176 infra & accompanying text. Also left to be decided is
whether a district court decision to cancel in a Scanwell-type suit should be given collateral estoppel effect by the Court of Claims to preclude the contractor from recovering
damages for his performance. For another context in which the question of collatet'al
estoppel between the district court and the Court of Claims may arise see note 255 infra.
157 446 F.2d 261 (Sth Cir. 1971).
158 Lloyd Wood Constr. Co. v. Sandoval, 318 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
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Force to award the contract to Lloyd Wood.6 0 But by then the
Air Force had become more obliging. As a result of the district
court's decision on the eligibility question, it rescinded the Notice
of Award to Campbell and awarded the contract to Lloyd Wood.
Unfortunately for the interests of judicial economy, Campbell
proved to be every bit as litigious as Lloyd Wood had been. It
first protested to the GAO, which ruled that it could give Campbell no relief, since the Air Force had designated the award as urgent. 160 Campbell's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was equally fruitless. That court held that the SBA's size
determination was reasonable and that the district court therefore
erred in reversing it. But because the contract was close to completion, the court of appeals did not interfere with the award.'
Still
undaunted, Campbell turned to the Court of Claims, where it finally met with some success. The Court of Claims ruled that the
contracting officer was authorized to award the contract to Campbell upon receipt of the SBA's size determination, and that the Notice of Award subsequently mailed therefore created a binding contract. As a consequence the cancellation was treated as a termination for convenience under the Reiner case 62 and Campbell was al63
lowed to recover damages as provided by the termination clause.
When the smoke finaly cleared in the Campbell litigation, it
was apparent that the biggest loser was the federal government.
It was forced to undertake two and one-half years of litigation
and endure a shortage in military housing while the construction
project was delayed. In all, three courts and two federal agencies
had been brought into the controversy. When it was all over, not
only was the government forced to pay $77,000 more than the
price sought by the original contractor, but it was also liable to that
original contractor in damages for awarding the contract to a higher
bidder. If a benefit to the public is lurking somewhere in this proceeding, it is well camouflaged.
The chain of events in Campbell presents an extreme case but
it is still representative of the sort of price the public must pay for
allowing the bidder to enforce his interests. Adjudicating the
159 Id. at 1171-72.
160 Dec. Comp. Gen. B-170746 (Sept. 11, 1970) (unpublished).

161 Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 263-64 (5th
Cir. 1971).
62
1
See note 156 supra.
163 Allen M. Campbell Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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validity of an award in court is generally going to be costly, and
in government contracting extended delays attendant to such litigation are particularly detrimental. Admittedly, there can be some
public benefits from bidders' suits. One is the deterrent effect mentioned by the court in the Steinthal case. 1 Even if only a few suits
result in actual court intervention, the mere prospect of judicial
scrutiny should cause contracting officers to be more diligent. Because a principal purpose of the procurement laws is to assure that
the contract selected is the most advantageous to the government,
the effect of enjoining violations and inducing increased compliance
by procuring agencies should be to enhance the overall economy of
public purchasing.
It is doubtful, however, that the benefits to the public from
greater adherence to procurement rules are sufficient to outweigh
the many detriments of judicial review. The implication from
this is that if the dominant concern of the District of Columbia
Circuit were really the public's interests, it would never have given
the bidder access to the courts. The real focus of the Scanwell
court's attention must have been the private interests of the bidder.
This observation is corroborated by the Third Circuit's analysis in
Merriam, which held that the procurement statutes were intended to
protect private interests as well as public ones.' 6 5 But by describing the
164

455 F.2d at 1301.

16 5 See note 92 supra.

An appropriate inquiry at this juncture is to determine the success of disappointed
bidders in obtaining injunctive relief from the courts. The argument could be made that
if the courts were actually concentrating on protecting the bidder's private interests the
biddefs would have fared better than they have. In only a handful of the cases litigated
to date have the bidders been successful in securing preliminary or final injunctive relief
that survived appeal. The current scorecard is as follows:
Preliminary injunctions:
1. General Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 81,805 (D.C. Cir. June
16, 1972), dismissed as moot, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 81,810 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
2, 1972) (preliminary injunction pending decision by GAO).
2. Hayes Int'l Corp. v. Seamans, No. 71-381 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 1971).
3. Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., No. C-70 1493-LHB (N.D. Cal.
July 15, 1970).
4. Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. SBA, No. 70-312 (W.D. Okla. June
25, 1970).
Final injunctions:
1. Henry Spen & Co. v. Laird, 354 F. Supp. 586 (D.D.C. 1973) (ordered contracting officer to allow offeror to correct his bid).
,2. Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates, Inc. v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla.
1972) (ordered cancellation of illegal award).
3. Blount-Barfell-Dennehy, Inc. v. United States, No. 70-392 (W.D. Okla. Aug.
6, 1970) (ordered government to accept plaintiff's bidder's bond).
This difficulty in obtaining injunctive relief should not be viewed as an index of the
unwillingness of courts to recognize the bidder's interests as warranting legal protection.
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bidder as a private attorney general asserting the interest of the
public, the Scanwell court invoked a fiction that many of the district
courts mistook for substance. As a consequence these courts forced
all the competing considerations of public and private interest onto
a common scale, somehow balanced them against each other, and
reached a decision based on the net public benefit. The separate
questions of legality of the award and propriety of the remedy
sought were treated as one, and no attempt was made to distinguish
and isolate the various interests to be secured. 6 6 These steps would
not be taken until the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans.
Like all other equitable relief, an injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Although recognizing that the damages remedy available in the Court of Claims may not represent an
adequate remedy at law, many courts have viewed its availability as a sufficient basis for
denying injunctive relief because of the countervailing considerations. See, e.g., M.
Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The strong
public interest in unhindered implementation of governmental programs makes the
burden on a biddef seeking injunctive relief particularly onerous. See Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 84,154, at 89,999-16 (D.C. Cit.
1970). Nevertheless, the use of the preliminary injunction, when properly limited, was
specifically authorized by the court in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306,
1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In light of the compelling reasons for withholding injunctive relief, the occasional situations where injunctions are awarded, like the General
Electric case, dearly exhibit the courts' concern for the interests of the bidder.
A case that probably should be included in the first list is International Eng'r Co.
v. Richardson, No. 927-73 (D.D.C. July 10, 1973), where the court ordered the contracting officer to state reasons why he had notified a contractor submitting technical
data to the government to strike from the data report a clause which limited the government's use of the data. This case could be distinguished from the bidder cases, since
there existed a contractual relationship between the parties, and the plaintiff therefore
had traditional rights under the contract. Further, the ASPR provisions which deal
with the government's rights in technical data, 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.202-2 to -3 (1972), could
arguably have been promulgated for the purpose of protecting the interests of the
contractor, see 32 C.F.R. § 9-202-1(b) (1972), and as such might serve as an independent source of traditional rights. Nonetheless, the district court apparently
thought that Scanwell controlled on the questions of standing and jurisdiction. Also,
to the extent that the salient consideration in the bidder cases is the courts' unwillingness
to interfere with the procurement process by substituting judicial judgment for that of
the contracting officer, International Engineering is quite relevant, for the court is in
effect requiring the contracting officer to show cause why his decision was the proper
one.

166 One notable exception is Judge Gesell's opinion in Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans,
317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970). The court held that award of the contract to anyone
other than the plaintiff would be illegal, but invoked its discretion to withhold injunctive relief, since it believed that a declaration of the plaintiff's rights and its opportunity
to recover damages was sufficient. Id. at 687-88. This action by the court in Simpson
may be incorrect in view of later decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit on the

limited power of the courts to deny an injunctive remedy. Notwithstanding this, Judge
Gesell's views on the proper role of courts in granting relief to bidders are well reasoned and represent the direction in which the courts should move. They are discussed
more fully at notes 223-27 infra and accompanying text.
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A Voice from Above: The Steinthal Delineation

As was discussed previously, the reason that procurement was
for so long treated differently from other administrative decisionmaking and effectively shielded from judicial review at the behest
of private parties centers on two policies - unhindered procurement and broad contracting officer discretion. 167 Lifting the standing bar in Scanwell did not dilute the potency of these policy considerations. Instead of precluding the bidder's recovery on jurisdictional grounds, they now produced dismissals on the merits.' 6 8
Though these policies are admittedly valid, it is clear that if
used to prohibit all judicial review of procurement they sweep far
too broadly. While there may exist a genuine need for some agency
discretion, there must also be clearly defined boundaries to contain
it.1' 6 The volumes of regulations governing the award of contracts,
held to have the force and effect of law,' 70 demonstrate that objective standards do exist by which to measure the propriety of a contracting officer's decision. And while some contracts are so closely
tied to the national welfare that they should go unhindered, in most
cases this compelling public interest in judicial forebearance is miss71
ing.'
When applied to the public-interest/private-interest confusion
created by Scanwell, this analysis provides the framework for understanding the Steinthal opinion. By the time the District of Columbia Circuit decided that case, it had had one and one-half years of
experience in adjudicating bidders' suits. It had thus developed the
expertise necessary to define precisely which private and public interests were at stake and to sharpen the criteria for injunctive relief
to secure them more effectively. It is therefore incorrect to view
Steinthal as the drastic retreat from Scanwell claimed by some obSee notes 39-43 supra & accompanying text.
168 Typical are the cases discussed at note 153 supra.
169 In Scanwell Judge Tamm stated:
[I]t is incontestable that many areas of government contracting are properly
left to administrative discretion; the courts will not invade the domain of this
discretion, but neither can the agency or official be allowed to exceed the legal
petimeters thereof. Contracting officers can exercise discretion upon a broad
range of issues confronting them; they may not, however, opt to act illegally.
When the bounds of discretion give way to the stricter boundaries of law, administrative discretion gives way to judicial review.
424 F.2d at 874 (footnotes omitted).
170 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Schoenbrod v. United States, 410
F.2d 400 (Cr. Cl. 1969); G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
171 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
167
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servers.17 2 Properly interpreted, Scanwell first opened the courtroom
door to suits by bidders; Steinthal merely adjusted the width it
should be kept ajar. All the court held was that reasonable limitations exist on the scope of review to be exercised by courts in surveying a contract award, limitations that had been implicit in the
Scanwell decision. 7 3
In shaping the test for injunctive relief the Steinthal court was
faced with three interests to accommodate. There were those two
traditional sources of public concern - broad discretion and unobstructed procurement. 174 Juxtaposed to them was the interest in assuring compliance with the procurement laws. The latter had been
labeled a public interest by the Scanwell court, but can also be
viewed as the private bidder's interest in receiving a fair opportunity
to compete for the award in accordance with the regulations. 175 To
secure these countervailing interests the court in Steinthal developed
a two-fold test for awarding injunctive relief. The first part, designed to accord contracting officers the discretion granted them by
statute, requires that the award be upheld whenever there is a
rational basis for making it.176 Otherwise it is illegal. At this
point the compliance interest predominates, no matter how strong
the considerations of public policy. The public interest in unhindered procurement is protected by the second part of the test, which
authorizes the courts to withhold injunctive relief on equitable
grounds when some overriding public policy so requires. The court
made clear that this exercise of equitable discretion was proper only
in certain "urgent" situations which should not arise often. 77
What Steinthal did therefore was to give specific definition to
the situations where the private and public interests in compliance
2

See note 30 supra.
The Scanwell court predictated judicial review upon the plaintiff's establishing
a prima facie case that the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
illegal. 424 F.2d at 866-67, 875.
74
'
See text accompanying note 167 supra.
17 5 See text preceding note 152 supra. The Steinthal court's labeling of public
and private interests is discussed in Speidel, supra note 126, at 87 n.84.
170 455 F.2d at 1301.
The rational basis standard utilized by the Steinthal court
is the longstanding measure of the scope of judicial review of administrative decisionmaking where agency discretion and expertise are involved. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207-09 (1947); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941);
see generally 4 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, §§ 30.05-30.10.
177 455 F.2d at 1301-02. The court of appeals elaborated upon this exception in
Serv-Air, Inc. v. Seamans, 473 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It pointed out that the denial
of injunctive relief, which would remit the wonged bidder to a damages remedy for his
bid preparation expenses only, should be applied '"only in extreme situations, as where
relief would delay or interfere with supply of items urgently needed in military opera17

173

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:559

controlled and injunctive relief was warranted. These guidelines replaced the ad hoc net public interest approach of the initial postScanwell cases, for the first bidders possessed concrete enforceable
limitations on the power of contracting officers to interfere with
their private interests.
3. Contemporaneous Developments in the Court of Claims
While some public benefit might arguably result from enjoining
an illegal award, little can flow from allowing the illegal award
to stand but requiring the government to pay damages to the injured
bidder.'7 8 Thus the Court of Claims decisions recognizing a bidder's
right to damages provide strong indication that the courts now view
violations of procurement law as an invasion of a private interest,
not just a public one, and believe this private injury is entitled to
compensation.
This cause of action for damages originated in a 1956 decision,
Heyer Products Co. v. United States,17 9 predating Scanwell by 14
years. It was based not on the interests in compliance with procttrement rules per se, but on the idea that bidders must be treated
with fairness to assure their continued participation in the procurement process. The court in Heyer Products was loyal to Lukens and stated that the procurement statutes themselves conferred no enforceable rights on the bidder. But it held there was
an implied condition on the government's solicitation of offers that
each bid would be fairly and honestly considered. The Court of
Claims believed that no businessman would be willing to undertake the expense of preparing a bid unless he thought it would be
tions." Id. at 160. This makes it clear that the grounds for refusing to enjoin an
awafd that has been adjudicated illegal, at least in a pre-procurement context, are quite
narrow.

A decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit presents an example of such
a situation. In the only bidder's suit apparently brought in that circuit, the court held
that the district court had abused its discretion by refusing to vacate an order festraining
the Army from awarding a contract for shells to be used in Vietnam. After the district court issued a restraining ordee, the Secretary of the Army supplied affidavits certifying that the national interest involved in the award was of overriding importance and
tood to be materially affected by the injunction. Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972).
178 Injunctive relief at least assures the public that the contract will ultimately
be performed by the bidder most advantageous to the government. See text accompanying note 164 supra. No such benefit follows from a monetary recovery. The
Campbell case illustrates this. Also, even the deterrent effect of liability for damages
is weak. Money judgments by the Court of Claims are not charged to the procuring
agency's appropriations. Pierson, supra note 10, at 46 & n.213.
179 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
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honestly assessed. As a result, it held that submitting a bid constitutes the acceptance of an offer whereby the government promises
to give that bid a fair evaluation."s When this implied contract
is breached the bidder is entitled to recover damages from the government under the Tucker Act.' 8 ' The damages recoverable are limited, however, to the bidder's expenses in preparing his offer. He
can receive no anticipated profits.
The grounds for relief in Heyer Products were narrow. 82 The
court phrased the bidder's cause of action in terms of a "fraudulent
inducement for bids," and held that to recover he must show by
clear and convincing evidence that his bid was solicited by the government with a prior intent to disregard it no matter how favorable
it was.'3
Subsequent decisions have reduced the burden on the
4 (decided after
bidder. In Keco Industries, Inc. v.United StateslM
Scanwell and citing it favorably), the Court of Claims held that
the bidder need not prove bad faith or intentional fraud; damages
were available under the Heyer Products doctrine any time the bid
was not "honestly considered."'8 5 And in ContinentalBusiness Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,' the Court of Claims caught up
with the District of Columbia Circuit. Chief Judge Cowen, writing for a unanimous court, held that the bidder's right to an honest evaluation of his bid was violated any time there was no reasonable basis for the award,'8 7 citing M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans.
These decisions by the Court of Claims provide an excellent
model for analyzing the expanding judicial awareness of the need
for legally protecting the bidder's private interests. The initial concern is for providing some minimal level of fairness out of inherent notions of fair play and the need to assure the integrity of
the bidding process. Next, the procurement process is increasingly viewed as being subject to rule of law, and the bidder's
interests deemed worthy of protection in their own right. The
final result is a single objective standard of legality, governing the
180 Id.at 412-13.
18128 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
182 Apparently they were too narrow for the Heyer Products Co. In a subsequent
opinion the court dismissed the company's petition upon finding a legally sufficient basis
to justify the government's rejection of its bid. Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 177
F.Supp. 251 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
183 140 F. Supp. at 414.
184 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
185 Id. at 1237.
186 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
187 Id.at 1021-22.
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availability both of injunctive relief in the district courts and of
damages in the Court of Claims. If a violation of this standard
entitles the bidder to a personal monetary recovery it is difficult to
see how what is being protected is anything other than his private
interests. He now possesses a traditional right against the government.187a

IV.

THE BIDDER'S TRADITIoNAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE RATIONAL

BASIS TEST

The extent to which a court will intervene and oversee the decisions made by an administrative agency is typically captioned, to
use the words of Professor Davis, "Scope of Review of Application
of Legal Concepts to Facts."'' s8 Because this Note examines the
problem from the standpoint of the individual bidder, the topic is
here framed in terms of the scope of the bidder's traditional rights
against the government. This characterization makes it clear that
the degree of judicial interference with administrative discretion is
also the degree of legal protection of the bidder's interests. The
present inquiry is to assess the scope of this protected area.
To define the role of the courts in overseeing procurement, the
court of appeals in Steinthal invoked the traditional doctrine for
judicial review over areas of agency discretion: the court is not to decide the issue as an original proposition and substitute its judgment
for that of the administrator. Instead it is to uphold the agency
decision so long as there exists a rational basis for making it.8 "
More an admonishment to respect the judgments of the administrator than a precise legal standard, the rational basis guideline leaves
0
considerable room for the courts to determine what is reasonable.1
187a As a postscript to this discussion it should be pointed out that while the Court
of Claims has been willing to expand the bidder's cause of action, as of yet, no bidder
has succeeded in recovering damages under it.
188 4 K. DAvis, supra note 35, § 30.
189 455 F.2d at 1301-02; see authorities cited at note 176 supra.
10 As an initial proposition there exists a spectrum of possible levels of judicial protection. At one end point there is full-scale review, a complete substitution of judgment approach. See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 35, § 30.06. With plenary review there
would no longer be administrative discretion to choose between arguably equivalent
bids. The individual bidder could p'ove a set of facts that would entitle him to the
award. At the other endpoint there is no judicial protection whatsoever. Administrative discretion is unfettered, and the bidder is bound by whatever decision the agency
makes. The latter is essentially the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine codified in
the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970). In between these points is a range of possibilities where the bidder has no dear right to the award itself but is not completely subject to administrative whim. The use of the "rational basis" test merely indicates that
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Conceptually the rational basis test produces what might be
thought of as a class of permissible decisions for the administrator
to make.'' These permissible decisions translate into a pool of acceptable contractors. Each contractor in the pool possesses a combination of attributes that would make him the most advantageous
offeror under some reasonable system of evaluation. Excluded from
the pool are the bidders who cannot demonstrate such a set of qualifications. Each of these is dearly inferior to at least one of the bidders included in the permissible-contractor pool. The contracting
officer has complete and unbounded freedom to select among the
bidders in the pool but is prohibited from choosing anyone outside
of it. The enforceable interest of the individual bidder amounts to
a traditional right to be included in the pool when he is so entitled.
Several technical problems arise from utilizing this limited review model as the determinant of the bidder's enforceable rights
against the government. Their source is the gap between the benefits to which the bidder has a legally protected right and the benefits he actually seeks. While the bidder's only right is to be included in the pool, no payoff attaches until the bidder is selected
and allowed to perform the contract. The disappointed bidder has
two grounds upon which to demonstrate an award is invalid as to
him: (1) he was included in the pool but the award was made to
someone outside of it; or (2) he was entitled to be in the pool,
but for some reason was excluded.192 The problem arises once the
bidder has proven one of these bases and seeks legal or equitable
relief. He is not entitled to the award itself, for it could have
the courts will take a stance somewhere in this middle ground. The precise point along
the spectrum is left to be decided on a case-by-case approach.
191 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 973 (1969).
192 It is unclear whether the plaintiff can invalidate the award if he was wrongfully excluded, but the award was subsequently made to someone in the pool. There
may have been no rational basis for excluding the plaintiff but there was a rational basis
for selecting the bidder chosen. The issue is whethef the rational basis test is to be applied only to the final outcome of the process or to every decision made along the way.
The language in Steintbal implies that every decision in the procedure is subject to the
test. 455 F.2d at 1301-02. This result coincides with what occurs in practice. Frequently a bidder will contest his exclusion as nonresponsive or not responsible before
any award is made. See, e.g., Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d
1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Furthermore, the pool membership of each bidder, X, is dependent upon which other bidders are included. Once there exists a bidder Y whose
bid is superior to X's under all reasonable evaluation criteria, thefe is no longer a rational basis for awarding the contract to X. If Y's bid is rejected as nonresponsive, X
can get into the pool. If that determination is reversed, however, X is no longer a permissible contractor. Consequently, whether a particular bidder belongs in the pool and
therefore whether an award to him is legal cannot be ascertained until the qualifications
of every other bidder have been properly evaluated.
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been made to any other bidder in the pool. Since he might not
have received the contract anyway, the total anticipated profits under
the contract overstate his loss. At the same time the bid preparation
remedy will usually understate it. He would not have bid for the
contract unless he believed that the expected value of future profits exceeded the costs of submitting a bid. The amount to which
the bidder is properly entitled is the value of his right to be included
in the permissible contractor pool. It is this value that the courts
should estimate in giving the bidder monetary relief.
The problem is complicated further because, even if a bidder can
prove he is the only permissible member of the pool, he still is not
entitled to the contract or its anticipated profits. First, the contracting officer is not required to accept any of the bids received in a given solicitation. He has the statutory authority to reject all bids if
the head of the agency certifies that such action is in the public interest."9 3 Also, procurement law departs from the traditional
common law view that once the contract is formed each party is entitled to the full prospective benefit of his bargain. Under the standard termination for convenience clause required in every government contract, the government possesses the power to terminate
the contract at any time it chooses before performance is completed. 9 4 When this power is exercised, the contractor's recovery is
limited to payment for any work performed prior to termination.
Because the bidder can never be guaranteed receipt of the contract
profits until he has been awarded the contract and performed the
work, and since whether he will be allowed to do so is contingent
upon the exercise of administrative discretion, potential profits are a
highly speculative measure of the damage a bidder suffers when
the contract is wrongfully awarded to another.
These contingencies have long been advanced to support the theory that no bidder has a legally protected right to a contract award.
But in practice the areas of administrative discretion may not be
that broad. In formal advertising, for example, the permissible contractor pool may frequently consist of only one bidder. Admittedly the statutory criterion "most advantageous to the United States"' 5
193

194

10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1970).
See 32 C.F.R. §§ 8.700 to .706 (1972); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-8.700 to .706 (1972).

Even if the clause is omitted from the express terms of the contract, it is included as a
matter of law. G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.),

cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
195 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970).
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is broadly phrased, and the courts have recognized that factors other
than price may be weighed by the contracting officer.198 Nonetheless, the actual selection tends to be rather mechanical: all bidders not responsible and responsive to the invitation for bids are excluded; then the award is made to the remaining bidder who offers the lowest price. Price is typically the sole determinant.'
The government's powers to reject and terminate are also more
limited in their actual implementation than in theory. Contracting officers are unlikely to reject a bidder who stands ready to perform an important government contract and has offered to do so
on the most advantageous terms, especially since the officer has already subjected the government to the expense of soliciting a number of competing proposals. Consequently, rejection and termination
should be invoked only in special situations. 98 If used extensively, they would cause bidders to be reluctant to undertake the expense
necessary to bid because of the probability that no contract would
ultimately be awarded. In view of these considerations, there is no
reason why rejection and termination should be exempted from the
rational basis requirement. The Steinthal decision itself dealt with
the reasonableness of a contracting officer's determination to cancel
196 See, e.g., Scanwell Labofatories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 869 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
197 Professors Nash and Cibinic conclude:
Although the statute and regulations appear to grant a broad discretion to the
contracting officer, in practice if the low bidder is responsible and responsive
it is difficult to overcome the requirement of award to that biddef, 37 COMP.
GEN. 51 (1957). If any basis for evaluation other than price is to be used,
the relative weights to be accorded various factors must be specified in the invitation, 36 CoMP. GEN. 380 (1956).
R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROcUREMENT LAW 262 (2d ed. 1969). Awarding
the contract to the lowest bidder in all but exceptional situations appears to have been
the intent of Congress in drafting the Armed Services Procurement Act. The Senate
Report provides:
Section 3(b) [10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970)) states that contracts shall be
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder whose bid will be most advantageous to the Government, price and other factors considered, and that the Government may reject all bids when such action is deemed advisable ....
In virtually all cases this will result in an awar'd to the lowest responsible bidder.
However it will also provide for situations where the public interest dictates
an award to someone other than the lowest responsible bidder.
S. REP. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
198 Nash and Cibinic point out that not only does rejection entail the expense and
delay of resolicitation, it also operates to compromise the competitive system. Opening,
and making, public bids without an award permits each bidder to learn the amounts
quoted by his competitors. As a result, rejection and cancellation should not be authorized without compelling reasons. R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, supra note 197, at 262-63;
see Massman Constr. Co. v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 635, 643 (Ct. Cl. 1945); 40
COMP. GEN. 671,674 (1961).
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the invitation and reject all bids after they had been opened. 9'
The application of the test to termination decisions, however, is
200
less clear.
The bidder should enjoy a traditional right to a fair and reasonable evaluation of his bid and to be included in the permissible
contractor pool if he is so entitled. Rarely exercised administrative
discretion should not serve to limit the bidder's legal protection.
The courts should look to general procurement practices as the
source for sound limits on the procuring agency's freedom of selection. From these practices, presumptions as to the unreasonableness
of certain actions can be developed to make the bidder's rights more
meaningful. For example, in advertised procurement the lowest
bidder should have a right to the award unless the government can
supply compelling reasons for making some other factor determinative. Similarly, any rejection of bids after opening, at least when the
bidder can show that the general level of prices offered was reasonable, should be closely scrutinized. In this manner the courts can expand and clarify the guidelines for what constitutes a rational basis.
As a result, the breadth of the permissible contractor pool will be
narrowed, and the right to pool membership will bring with it an
increased probability of ultimately receiving the contract profits.
From the cases decided to date it is difficult to determine how
far along the judicial-review/administrative-discretion spectrum 2°
the courts will choose to operate. The language used by the Steinthal court in outlining the rational basis test manifested a view that
the role of the courts should be minimal: that they should confine
their interventions to a relatively few clear cases."02 But this language should not necessarily be taken at face value. First, as will
199 455 F.2d 1299-1300.
The contracting officer's powers under the clause are broad. In dictum the Court
of Claims has stated that the clause may grant the government a right to terminate "at
will," but the court goes on to imply that the right may not encompass bad faith or a
clear abuse of discretion. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 442
(Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964). The bad faith ground has been
asserted by some contractors, see, e.g., Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. CL 605, 612
(1959), but most of these cases have failed on the proof. A decision by the Comptroller
General indicates that termination fof the purpose of obtaining lower prices from a
competitor of the incumbent contractor may be permissible. Dec. Comp. Gen. B125486 (Dec. 6, 1963) (unpublished). Nash and Cibinic question whether most courts
would go along with this view. R. NASH & J. CIBiNiC, supra note 197, at 759.
201 See note 190 supra.
202 See 455 F.2d at 1300-01. The author of the Steinthal opinion, Judge Leventhal,
reiterated this viewpoint in an address delivered in August 1972. He stated that in
only a very small number of cases can the courts render meaningful decisions and described judicial intervention as "extreme medicine, not daily bread." 443 BNA FED.
CONT. REP. A-10 to A-11 (1972).
200
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be discussed,-2 a most of the court's arguments for narrow review
were directed at granting the injunctive remedy only and not at judicial review of administrative decisionmaking generally. Second, as
the term "rational basis" provides such a nebulous criterion for the
reviewing courts, the content of the standard must be discerned from
the facts of each case. And the particular facts of the Steinthal litigation did not present a very compelling case for holding that the
procurement decision in question was arbitrary °4 The court of appeals' determination to reverse can not therefore be read as a significant restriction on the breadth of judicial review. It may have been
2 03

See notes 219-21 infra & accompanying text.
Stdnthal involved a contract for the production of Air Force parachutes. Two
suppliers, Steinthal and Pioneer, submitted bids that conformed to the specifications in
the invitation. Steinthal's bid was the lower of the two. The litigation arose over
the meaning of the delivery schedule requirement. Originally the invitation stated
that the first shipment was to be received in 140 days, but further provided that "in no
event shall the bidder's delivery schedule extend beyond 30 days after completion date
on each increment." This was later amended by reducing the time fof the first shipment to 120 days and deleting the phrase "extend beyond 30 days" in the slippage
clause. The latter modification was intended to convert the desired delivery schedule to
a mandatory one, but, since too many words had been deleted, what resulted was the
nonsensical phrase "in no event shall the bidder's delivery schedule after completion
date on each increment." Pioneer gave the amendment the interpretation intended by
the contracting authority. Steinthal, on the other hand, concluded that the schedule
was merely precatory and submitted a bid guaranteeing delivery wihin 150 days. When
the Air Force proposed an award to Steinthal, Pioneer protested on the ground that
Steinthal's bid was not responsive to the required delivery schedule.
Pioneer contested the award to the contracting officer involved pursuant to the pi'ocedure discussed at note 22 supra. In his decision rejecting Pioneer's challenge, the contracting officer admitted that the amended invitation was subject to differing interpretations, but concluded that it should be construed to provide for a desired schedule only,
with delivery required within a reasonable time after the desired dates. He determined
that rejection and readvertisement would be overly prejudicial to Steinthal and recommended that the contract be awaided to it. 455 F.2d at 1293-94 & nn.8-9. This
opinion was submitted to the Air Force Logistics Command Headquarters, which returned a list of comments criticizing the contracting officer's findings. The contracting
officer then reevaluated his findings and decided to cancel the invitation under 32
C.F.R. § 2A04-1(b)(1) (1972), which lists inadequate or ambiguous specifications as
one of the grounds for cancelling an invitation after bid opening. Pioneer appealed
this decision to another contracting officer who also determined that the invitiation
was ambiguous and upheld the cancellation.
Next, both Steinthal and Pioneer filed protests with the GAO. Both were denied.
Dec. Comp. Gen. B-170174 (Aug. 14, 1970) (unpublished). Steinthal then commenced an action in district court alleging the cancellation was arbitrary and capricious.
That court issued a permanent injunction against opening the new bids and awarding
the contract to anyone othe' than Steinthal. No. 2422-70 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1970).
This was the decision under review by the court of appeals. The language contained
in the delivery schedule, after the amendments, was meaningless. The amended clause
had been interpreted in two different ways by the two bidders, and the contracting authority's construction of the language upon reviewing it was the opposite of the meaning
it intended originally. Four different reviewing bodies had viewed the invitation as
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant cancellation. There is little in this factual situation
to indicate that the decision to cancel because of the ambiguity was unreasonable.
2 04
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little more than a stern admonishment to the district courts not to
substitute their judgment for that of the procuring agency.
A more recent insight into the District of Columbia Circuit's idea
of the proper scope of judicial review is provided by Northeast
Construction Co. v. Romney. 0 5 At issue in Northeast was the
propriety of the contracting officer's decision that the bidder's failure to specify his goals for employing minority manpower, as required by the Department of Labor, rendered his bid nonresponsive.2°0 The district court granted the plaintiff injunctive relief,
and held that the bidder's omission of the required information constituted a minor irregularity because the bidder had committed himself to employ the minimum percentage of minority workmen by
signing the bid. The omission should therefore have been waived
20 7
by the contracting officer.
The court of appeals reversed, but did not base its holding on
the narrow scope of judicial review. Rather it determined that the
district court had proceeded on an erroneous legal premise concerning the binding effect of the contractor's failure to specify his goals,
and added that there is a serious question whether a contracting
officer possesses the power to exempt a bidder from the Labor Department's mandate.20 8 This was the view of Judges Tamm and Leventhal."0 9 Chief Judge Bazelon dissented, stating that the bidder's
omission should have been classified as a minor irregularity. 210 The
result was that two judges implied that for the contracting officer
to resolve the issue in any other way would have been unsupportable, while the third member of the panel stated that the decision
the officer made was invalid. Although the majority upheld the contracting officer's determination, the approach of the entire court
was more along the lines of substitution of judicial judgment than
of deference to administrative discretion.
These decisions disclose no pervasive judicial plan to stretch the
18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 82,065 (D.C. Cit. March 6, 1973).
Under the Washington Plan, similar to the Philadelphia Plan discussed at note
137 supra, prospective contractors must attach an appendix to theif bid estimating their
total employment of minorities in certain trades under the contract. Submission of the
appendix is made a prerequisite for eligibility on certain federal construction projects
pursuant to iregulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, 41 C.F.R. § 60-5 (1972).
207 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. a 80,459 (D.D.C. 1971). The contracting officer is authorized to waive or permit correction of a "minor informality or irregularity" that is a
matter of form and not substance under 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.405 (1972).
208 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. at 87,278-80.
209 Judge Tamm had dissented in the Steinthal decision.
210 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. at 87,282-84.
205
206
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bounds of the permissible contractor pool and give the agencies free
reign in bidder selection. Many of the traditional policies favoring
broad administrative discretion do not apply to the contemporary
procurement systems. The availability of bid protest review by the
GAO makes it unlikely that limiting the role of the judiciary would
result in a significant reduction in the amount of outside interference with the agency's decisions. Moreover, GAO review would
appear less desirable from the standpoint of the procuring agency
than judicial intervention. The review exercised by the Comptroller General tends to be plenary: it covers matters of sound procurement policy, as well as technical compliance with, the procurement
statutes and regulations."' The primary effect of restricting judicial
review is therefore not to leave more decisions to the discretion of
the contracting officer but to rely more upon the judgment of the

GAO.
The relative expertise argument 212 for relying on review by the
GAO instead of by the courts is tenuous. First, although the GAO
has developed considerable experience in interpreting the procurement laws, it lacks any capacity to make the sort of technical and
scientific judgments which procurement litigation frequently requires.2 13 These issues can be resolved only by the courts through
the use of scientific experts. Even if issues of procurement law are
particularly esoteric, as the court implied in Steinthal,"4 many' of
211 John Reinet & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 931 (1964). In Reiner the court contrasted the standard of review applied
by the courts to that of the GAO and concluded:
Because of his general concern with the proper operation of competitive bidding in government procurement, (the Comptroller General] can make iecommendations and render decisions that, as a matter of procurement policy,
awards on contracts should be cancelled or withdrawn even though they would
not be held invalid in court. He is not confined to the minimal measure of
legality but can sponsof and encourage the observance of higher standards by
the procuring agencies.
Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
These statements touched off some controversy over the actual scope of GAO review.
The Comptroller has asserted that he lacks the broad powers attributed to him by the
Court of Claims. R. NAsH & J. CImNIC, supra note 197, at 67-68. Leading commentators have nonetheless concluded that GAO review is indeed quite broad, often
involving substitution of its judgment for that of the agency. Cibinic & Lasken, The
Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349, 380-83
(1969).
-212 This argument was stressed by the court in Wheelabrator. 455 F.2d at 1316.
213 See, e.g., Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016
(Ct. Cl. 1971), where the GAO had earlier rejected the plaintiff's protest because it
fequired technical judgments beyond the competence of the GAO. Id. at 1019. The
GAO decision is reported at 48 CoMP. GEN. 314 (1968).
214 455 F.2d at 1301 & nn.35-38.
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the federal courts have attained the necessary competence to address them. The prime example is the Court of Claims, a principal
forum for contract cases. 1 ' It has frequently adjudicated the question of award legality when raised by the government as a defense
to a contractor's suit for damages resulting from wrongful cancellation.21 6 Also, new adjudicative boards could be established that
availwould combine the expertise in procurement issues currently
21 7
able in the GAO with more extensive factfinding powers.
V.

A.

PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCING THE BIDDER'S RIGHTS

Searchingfor the PalatableRemedy

Many of the arguments frequently advanced for restricting, in
the context of review of procurement decisions, the federal courts'
traditional role of watchdog over administrative arbitrariness 1 8 do
not result from the propriety of review per se. Rather they reflect a
distaste for the remedies consequential to that review, especially injunctive relief.21a The courts have been unwilling to recognize that
the bidder possesses the sort of interest that would permit him to
come into court and bring the procurement process to a halt. This
concern was quite apparent in the Steinthal decision, where the court
viewed the award process as the source of numerous technical ob2 15

The Court of Claims' jurisdiction extends to "any claim against the United
States founded.. . upon any express or implied contract with the United States .... " 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). The standard disputes clause required in every government contract provides that contract appeals boards are to hear questions of fact arising under
the contract, and that these decisions are to be final. E.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-12 (1972);
41 C.F.R. §§ 7.101-12 (1972). But under the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22
(1970), the Court of Claims has review over any questions of law. Also, all breach of
contract claims based on actions or omissions by the government beyond the scope of
the contract can be brought in the Court of Claims.
2 16
See authorities discussed at note 47 supra. If the Court of Claims upholds the
award the contractor can recover termination damages under Reiner. See note 156
supra. But when an award has been illegally made, the bidder's remedy is limited to
quantum meruit fo' the value of tangible benefits actually received by the government.
Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
217 Commentators have suggested numerous alternatives to the current bid protest review by the GAO. Among them are the Nash and Cibinic "bid board" approach
combining bid protests and contracts disputes into one giant board of review, 267 BNA
FED. CoNT. REP. A-10 (1969), and the new agency advocated by Eldon Crowell, a
District of Columbia practitioner, that would have both injunctive and damages remedies at its disposal, 423 BNA FED. CONT. REP. A-14 (1972).
218 Berger concludes that judicial review of administrative action that is arbitrary or
in excess of statutory authority is more than "traditional." He points out that it existed
long before the APA was enacted and may even be of constitutional import. See Betger, supra note 191, at 980-82.
218a See Speidel, supra note 126, at 74-75.
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jections that the bidder could raise to get himself before the courts.
Even though the vast majority of these decisions are destined to fail
on the merits, the resulting litigation would bog down procurement
significantly. 219 The Steinthal court further believed that the emergency nature of actions to enjoin awards rendered it improbable
that the courts could consider the close and complex issues inherent
in procurement litigation with the necessary depth and certainty.
Because of the resulting possibility of judicial error, the court should
deny issuing an injunction unless a clear showing of illegality is
made. 22 The court added that in the more relaxed atmosphere of
an action for damages, there was a better opportunity for the court
to handle the case with sufficient depth.2
If these problems in adjudicating claims for injunctive relief
were the true concern in Steinthal, the court's two-fold test should
be restructured. The court viewed the judicial discretion to deny
injunctive relief once an award has been adjudged illegal as limited
to the most urgent cases.2" 2 The result is that the bidder must bear
a heavy burden in showing the proposed award is invalid, but once
that showing has been made the burden shifts to the government to
show an overriding public interest for withholding the injunction.
This test emphasizes the wrong issue. The award should be held invalid any time the contracting officer abuses his discretion or violates a procurement regulation. If the possibility for impeded procurement and emergency litigation is so undesirable, the court
should have been less willing to authorize final injunctions in Steinthal and preliminary ones in Wheelabrator. But these considerations do not justify narrowing the scope of judicial review. Injunctive remedies should be reserved for those special cases where the
contract is so important to the proper bidder that no monetary
remedy can make him whole or so important to the public that it
should be performed by the rightful bidder. This is essentially the
view advanced by Judge Gesell in one of the first post-Scanwell decisions, Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans.2m
The court in Simpson, after determining that the contracting
officer acted arbitrarily in excluding the plaintiff's bid modification
as not timely, proceeded to the question of the appropriate remedy.
219

455 F.2d at 1301-02.

22 01d.at 1303.
221 Id.
222

See note 154 supra& accompanying texL

223

317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
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The plaintiff argued that because he was the lowest bidder the
cou'rt should issue a mandatory injunction awarding him the contract. As authority he cited the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in Superior Oil Co. v. Udall,224 where the court affirmed
a district court order compelling the Secretary of the Interior to
issue a long-term lease to the plaintiff-bidder. 25 Stressing the discretionary nature of injunctive relief, the Simpson court distinguished Superior Oil on two grounds: (1) the lease at issue there
called for long-term performance involving millions of dollars; and
(2) performance under the lease had not begun, while in Simpson
it had. 226 The Simpson court believed that in routine short-term
procurements like the one at bar it was sufficient to enter a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff. Such a procedure gives the government the option to (1) cancel the contract and award it to the
proper party, (2) resolve the dispute through negotiation, or (3)
allow the declaratory judgment winner to sue for damages in the
Court of Claims. 227 This solution supplies the government with the
discretion it needs to keep the procurement function unimpeded,
but it does so without subtracting from the bidder's right to a reasonable consideration of his bid.
If courts are to follow the Simpson approach and exercise broad
discretion in denying injunctive relief, the alternate remedy at law
must be made more attractive.228 The bidder should be able to recoup some of the profits he would have earned but for having been
wrongfully deprived of the contract. Some have advocated permitting a bidder to recover anticipated profits if he can prove that he
would have received the award had proper procurement procedures
But this remedy is not particularly palatable
been followed.Y
either. Even though the governmental agency was at fault, the pub409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Superior Oil case was decided one year before Scanwell, yet Superior's standing as a bidder was never challenged by the court. Also, the propriety of one aspect of
the Superior Oil holding, that courts possess the power to order an award, is doubtful
in view of language in Scanwell and subsequent decisions. See Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
226 317 F. Supp. at 688.
227 Id.
2 28
The courts have been unwilling to hold that the present remedy of bid preparation expenses constitutes an adequate remedy at law. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (D.C. Cit. 1971); Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d
667, 669 (D.C. Cit. 1971).
229 See, e.g., Pierson, supra note 10, at 46. Professor Speidel believes that the bidder should receive the "net gains" he lost by being wrongfully denied the award. He
supports this approach by citing several recent decisions finding liability where reliance
has been induced or expectations of profits created but no enforceable agreement has yet
224

225
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lic purse should not be used to pay two or more bidders the profits
for the same contract, especially since none of them incurred any
actual loss. Moreover, the existence of government discretion would
make it difficult for most bidders, even if their bids appear more
fav6rable than the competition's, to prove they would have received
the contract.
To recompense the losses the bidder realistically suffered requires
an alternative damages formula. If the bidder's only enforceable
interest is to be included in the permissible contractor pool, this
is the interest that should be remedied. The amount of damages
the bidder should recover is the expected value of his right to pool
membership. While determining this value is admittedly rather
speculative, the problem is similar to the one frequently confronted
by courts in valuing a contract right where the promised performance is conditional upon the occurrence of some fortuitous event in
the future.3 0 The court must estimate the amount of profits likely
to be earned ultimately under- the contract and multiply this figure
by the probability that the plaintiff's bid would have been selected
over those of the other bidders in the pool. Perhaps some simplified formula could be developed that would divide the total profits
available by the number of bidders who have anything close to a .5
probability of receiving the award. In practice, the problem will
typically involve no more than two or three responsive and permissible bidders, and the court's task will be to estimate, for example, whether the plaintiff who can make delivery in 50 days
for a price of $3,000 has a probability of being selected that is
roughly equivalent to that possessed by a competitor who can deliver in 35 days but asks $3200. The ultimate burden of proving
come into existence under traditional contract law. Speidel, supra note 126, at 92 &
n. 99. One author would go so far as to remedy an illegal award by allowing the bidder
who should have received the contract to recover expected profits and allowing every
other bidder to recover bid preparation expenses. See Comment, Government Contract
Bid Protests: Judicial Review and the Role of the Court of Claims, 39 U. Cm. L. REv.
814, 833 (1972).
230
See generally 5 A. CORBIN, COc'tRAcrs § 1030 (1964). Professor Corbin
uses the example of valuing the right of a horse owner, A, against B who had previously
offered a prize to the winner of a race in which A's horse is entered, but then prohibits
the horse from running in the race. Id. at 182-83. A's plight is analogous to that of
the disappointed bidder. Since it can never be known for certain whether A's horse
would have won, A is dearly not entitled to the entire prize. But allowing A to recover only the consideration he paid, his entry fees, would be equivalent to the bid
preparation expenses remedy of Heyer Products ancd would tend to understate his
probable loss. Corbin cites several cases where the courts have been willing to grant
the plaintiff damages equal to the estimated "market value of the conditional right at
the time of the breach .... " (The quoted language is taken from REsTATEMENT OF
CONTrRAC'S § 332 (1932), which adopts this rule.)
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this estimated probability will always be on the plaintiff. And
though his task is a difficult one, he should prefer it to having his
recovery limited to bid preparation expenses. Moreover, it should
be remembered that the forum that will be making these estimates
is the Court of Claims, a body with considerable experience in government contracts. This expertise should help assure that the approximations arrived at are realistic ones. °a
The other problem inherent in awarding the bidder damages is
who will ultimately pay the judgment. One solution is to permit
the contracting agency to deduct it from payments to the incumbent
contractor who was wrongfully selected. Had the contract been
awarded lawfully, he would have received nothing; under this set-off
theory he is at least allowed some portion of the profits on the contract work. Unfortunately, this reasoning breaks down in cases
where the bidder was wrongfully excluded as nonresponsive or not
responsible, but the incumbent contractor belonged in the permissible bidder pool nonetheless."sl In these situations, the present contractor may have been selected even if the plaintiff had been treated
fairly. On the theory that he should not be penalized for the government's mistake, the government should be precluded from recouping the damages from him. The argument can be made, however, that because it is impossible to determine who would have received the award had the plaintiff's bid been evaluated properly, the
parties should be returned to their status quo before the award. And
under this view, the only amount to which each bidder is entitled is
the expected value of his pool membership at the start of the award
process. A set-off against the incumbent contractor would leave him
with no less than this amount.
There exists at present ample authority for developing a damages remedy for the bidder. Although one commentator has suggested that such a remedy would require amendment to the APA
to waive sovereign immunity from liability for damages,2 32 an
25oa The position of the Court of Claims in deciding these issues will be somewhat
similar to that enjoyed by the Tax Court, which has often made approximations of inexact monetary sums that involve questions lying within its area of expertise. For
example, in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930), the Second
Circuit instructed the Board of Tax Appeals to estimate a federal taxpayer's travel and
entertainment expenses over a 3-year period. The rationale inherent in Cohan, that,
even though the amount to Which a litigant is entitled cannot be determined with absolute certainty, it is better to allow him a sum which is admittedly somewhat speculative than to allow him nothing at all, is equally applicable in the present context.
231 See note 192 supra.
232 Pierson, supra note 10, at 43-44.
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amendment seems unnecessary in view of the present case law in the
Court of Claims. If the implied contract theory of Heyer Products
can support the recovery of reliance damages like bid preparation
costs, it should be adequate to support expectation damages like
prospective profits. The underlying contract in either case is the
same. And there is some indication that the Court of Claims would
be amenable to fashioning such a remedy. In a recent decision,
Chief Judge Cowen noted that the difficulties encountered by the
district courts in handling Scanwell had intensified the need for an
alternative remedy in damages.-2 3 Thus, both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Court of Claims appear to agree that the
public harm caused by enjoining the procurement process makes
money damages the most realistic remedy in routine award controversies.
B.

The Proper Forum

The only remaining question is which forum, court or agency,
is better equipped to decide bid protest issues. In Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, the court of appeals emphasized the expertise of
the GAO and stated that many procurement questions may be within its primary jurisdiction. 34 This review by the Comptroller General has two principal advantages-it is quick and it is inexpensive 2 5
It Provides the bidder with a prompt determination of his protest,
often while the award is still pending. There are several drawbacks,
however. First, the constitutional 23 6 and statutory237 authority of the
233 Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016, 1022
(Cr. Cl. 1971).
234 455 F.2d at 1313-17.
2 35
See 4 PROCUREMENT RiEP., supra note 7, at 44.
2 36
The GAO is an organ of the legislative branch. Some contend that awarding
contracts is stictly an executive function and intervention by the GAO raises questions

of separation of powers.

See, e.g., Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney General, to

Hon. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, June 14, 1971.
237
The Comptroller's ultimate source of authority is his statutory power to disallow
payments on contracts awarded in contravention of law. 31 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74 (1970).
Because he can hold contracting officers personally liable for these illegal awards, 31
U.S.C. § 492 (1970), they generally heed his advance opinions. Cibinic & Lasken,
supra note 211, at 358-59. In practical effect, therefore, these opinions are binding upon
the contracting officers. Id. at 375, 378. While the statutes authorize the Comptroller
to rendef advance opinions at the request of certain governmental officers, 31 U.S.C. §§
74, 82d (1970), there is no provision for review at the behest of bidders. It is thus
doubtful that the GAO possesses the authority to hear bid protests. Cibinic & Lasken,
supra note 211, at 376-77. But Congress' failure to take any action to limit the GAO's
protest review has been interpreted as an acquiescence in the GAO's jurisdiction. 4
PROCUREMENT RIEP., supra note 7, at 41.
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Comptroller General is questionable and the subject of frequent
controversy. Second, the procedural fairness of GAO factfinding
is open to criticism. Often the GAO, using ex parte communications, denies the parties an opportunity to confront and cross-

examine witnesses and to engage in discovery.238 When the facts
are in dispute, the GAO presumes the government's version is the
correct one. 2 9 Third, the GAO lacks injunctive power to compel
an agency to withhold an award while it decides a protest. It
must rely on the cooperation of the procuring agency. ° Fourth,
if the agency decides to make the award and the contractor begins
performance, protesting to the GAO will typically be futile.2 41 Even
if the GAO believes the award was improper, it is very reluctant to
interfere once performance under the contract has commenced. 2"
Notwithstanding these difficulties with GAO review, the Commission on Government Procurement has recommended the con2 43
tinuance of the GAO as a forum for resolving award protests.
The Commission's endorsement was based on different considerations from those advanced by the District of Columbia Circuit
arguing for GAO primary jurisdiction in Wheelabrator.44 Instead
of emphasizing the GAO's specialized knowledge in the procurement area, the Commission thought it desirable to give the bidder
a choice of forums. The GAO would allow the bidder expedited
review without the formality of full due process procedures. For
more complicated or important protests, he has access to the fedsupra note 7, at 44.
Id. at 43-44; see, e.g., Dec. Comp. Gen. B-176593 (Nov. 17, 1972) (unpub-

2384 PROCUREMENT REP.,
239

lished). For a more complete discussion of this problem see Speidel, supra note 126,
at 72 n.33.
240 The GAO's regulations request that agencies postpone making awards while protests are pending unless delay will be especially harmful. 4 C.F.R. § 204 (1973). Both
the ASPR and the FPR adopt this scheme in substantial part. 32 C.F.R. §§ 2.407 to
.408 (1972); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-2.407 to .408 (1972). Nonetheless, the contracting officer will frequently decide not to suspend the award. When this occurs performance
of the contract is typically well underway by the time the GAO decision is eventually
handed down. See Speidel, supra note 126, at 73 nf. 35-36.
241 Notwithstanding this phenomenon post-award protests continue to be filed. In
fiscal 1972, 55 percent of all protests decided by the GAO had been filed after award.
4 PROCUREMENT REP., supra note 7, at 45 n.61.
24 2
R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, supra note 197, at 964; see, e.g., 48 CoMP. GEN. 663,
668 (1969). The Commission on Government Procurement notes, however, that in
several recent decisions the GAO has recommended that an improperly awarded contract be terminated for convenience. 4 PROCUREMENT REP., supra note 7, at 45 &
n.62; see, e.g., 51 COMP. GEN. 423 (1971).
248 4 PROCUREMENT REP., supra note 7, at 40 (Recommendation 14).
244 See note 233 supra.
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eral courts. 245 The task now confronting the courts is to develop
a protest procedure and allocation of jurisdiction that makes the
best use of the relative advantages of the three forums involved
the district court, the Court of Claims, and the GAO. The focus of the Commission makes clear that the primary concern should
be the interests of the protesting bidder.
In addition to providing the bidder with a convenient first forum,
the GAO serves an important screening function for the federal
courts. Denial of a bid protest may be sufficient to convince a
bidder that his challenge lacks merit and that invoking the judicial
process would, prove futile. If the bidder does seek judicial review,
the GAO's opinion on the protest will have sharpened the issues
to ease the job of the reviewing court. And if the GAO upholds
the protest, because contracting officers tend to follow the Comptroller's advance opinions voluntarily,24 6 resort to compulsive judicial
remedies will be forestalled. 2 47
Nonetheless, the court's review function, even where the GAO
has previously decided the merits of the protest, must be a healthy
one. The standards of legality invoked by the GAO with a 'purpose
of promoting good contract policy may differ significantly from
those applied by the courts in enforcing a bidder's purposeful legal
rights. 248 Also the "exigencies of expedited procurement" criticism,
made in Steinthal with respect to cases in the district courts,249 applies with special force to opinions by the GAO, for it frequently
hears protests in a rushed preprocurement context. If the GAO is
to have primary jurisdiction over some procurement questions, the
245 4 PROCUREMENT REP., supra note 7, at 44.
Still another view on the benefit derived from GAO review is that advanced by
Professor Speidel. He believes that the GAO's primary impact has been to improve
the ongoing award system rather than to protect the interests of individual bidders.
Speidel, supra note 126, at 74. Consistent with this theory he advocates confining the
GAO's role to systematically reviewing groups of award decisions instead of deciding
particular bid protests. Id. at 90.
2 46
See note 237 supra.
247 This is not to say that the bidder who originally receives the award, after losing
in the GAO, will not go to court to secure injunctive relief. But one of the requirements
for obtaining a preliminary injunction is a showing that a strong probability exists that
the complaining party will prevail on the merits. See note 253 infra. Interposing
the GAO as a preliminary forum increases the probability that the contract will be
awarded to the propeef party by the time the case gets to court. Consequently, the
probability that the party challenging the award will prevail is reduced. Moreover, in
view of the deference shown to the expertise of the Comptroller General in cases like
Wheelabrator, it is unlikely that a bidder who failed to peesuade the GAO can make
the requisite showing.
2 48
See note 211 supra.
24 9
See notes 219-20 supra & accompanying text.
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courts must be cautious in defining the expanse of it. The Comptroller's experience in resolving bid protests should make him competent to interpret the language contained in bids and solicitations
or to handle questions of standard contract practice. But current
procurement involves many issues beyond the Comptroller General's
narrow expertise. Questions of congressional policy in attaining
nonprocurement objectives are a prime example. The GAO simply
does not possess the qualifications to decide cases like the validity of
the Philadelphia Plan under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.250 And
when a bidder has been remitted to the Comptroller's primary jurisdiction on a question the Comptroller is competent to decide, the
limited fact-finding resources and the lack of full due process safeguards available in the GAO require that its decision be closely
scrutinized by the reviewing court. As was stated in Wheelabrator,
' 251
it is the courts that must have the "last word.
Given these priorities, the optimal procedure for adjudicating a
bidder's protest would operate roughly as follows: The bidder, depending upon the issues involved in his protest and the amount of
resources he is willing to expend, will file his claim in either a district court or with the GAO. 52 In either event, he can request a
preliminary injunction from the district court to halt the award or
further performance under the contract. To obtain this relief, the
bidder must not only show that his case meets the special circumstances where final injunctions are proper but also demonstrate that
he has a strong probability of succeeding on the merits.2 53 This requirement assures that technical objections will not be permitted to
halt the procurement process. 54 Regardless of whether the bidder
2 50

The Comptroller held that an early version of the plan violated the principles of
competitive bidding and possibly was inconsistent with title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), and was therefore invalid. 48
COMP. GEN. 326 (1968). For discussions of this incident see Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 n.7, 165 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971); Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 211, at 378-80 nn. 138-44.
251 455 F.2d at 1316. This statement was applied by the District of Columbia Circuit in a subsequent decision reversing a district court order that conditioned the award
of a contract on the GAO's decision. General Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 18 CCH Cont.
Cas. F. 5 81,805 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1972), dismissed as moot, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F.
5 81,810 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 1972).
252 This is the procedure that the bidder will follow when the award has been proposed and is still pending. Once the award has been made, the bidder, aware of the difficulties in obtaining injunctive relief after performance has begun, may prefer to go directly to the Court of Claims and bring an action for damages.
253 Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 9 84,154
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Limbach Co. v. McCormick, No. 973-73 (D.D.C. May 24, 1973).
254 See note 219 supra & accompanying text.
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obtains injunctive relief, the court or the GAO should proceed to
the merits of the bidder's protest at an ordinary pace and not rush
its deliberation to give the bidder a quick pre-award decision. If
the award is found to be illegal, the reviewing body should determine, in light of circumstances existing at the time of its decision,
whether this situation meets the special requirements for final injunctive relief. If it does not the court should grant a declaratory
judgment to the bidder and remit him to other remedies. Perhaps
the government will decide to award him the contract voluntarily.
Otherwise the bidder can invoke his declaratory judgment in the
Court of Claims to obtain monetaary damages.2 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

Government contracting has become very big business. A
legal model that views a contract award as a windfall conferred
upon some fortunate business enterprise is no longer adequate. In
recent years a larger and larger part of the national economy has
been appropriated by the government and contracted out to private
businesses.25 6 Because of their significant economic stake, these
firms should be guaranteed the same fair opportunity to compete
for this public business as they possessed, by operation of the marketplace, for the private business it replaced.
255

An important question is whether a district court's decision that an award is invalid should be given collateral estoppel effect by the Court of Claims in a subsequent
action for damages. In Continental Business Enterprises the Court of Claims implied
that the same standard of legality now applies in both coufts. See note 187 supra &
accompanying text. And if the district courts are to deny injunctive relief upon equitable
grounds, they should have some assurance that a legal remedy is available. The problem with this solution, however, is that it gives the principal review function to the
district court, and makes its judgment binding upon a court with more experience in
the procurement subject matter, the Court of Claims. In practice, though, this problem should not be significant. While the Court of Claims would be bound by the district court's finding that some decision in the award process lacked a rational basis, it
still can exercise wide discretion in estimating the bidder's probability of receiving the
award. It is in this latter decision that the most expertise is needed.
Professor Speidel, on the other hand, views the issuance of a declaratory judgment
by a district court followed by an award of damages in the Court of Claims as an "unrealistic" solution. He would combine the injunctive and damages remedies in a single
court. Speidel, supra note 126, at 92. It is difficult to see how this proposal could be
beneficially accomplished. Making the district courts the exclusive forum ignores the
need for centralized expertise which the Court of Claims can provide. And making
the Court of Claims the lone forum would require a complete overhaul of that court's
jurisdiction since it presently lacks the power to issue equitable relief. United States
v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
256
In 1940, the year of the Lukens decision, purchases of goods and services by
fedefal, state, and local governments comprised 14.8 percent of the gross national product. By 1970, this figure had risen to 22.5 percent. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 1972, 312 (1972).
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The substantial economic impact of procurement upon the private sector is not the only factor favoring recognition of legal
rights in the bidder. Subjecting procurement to the rule of law
not only assures fair and honest consideration of bids by the government, but also enhances the probability that the public purpose
underlying the procurement laws - selection of the contract most
advantageous to the government - will be achieved. The expansive use of government contracts to confer special benefits upon
disadvantaged groups provides an additional reason why the Lukens view of procurement should be rejected. The courts must
acknowledge in its stead that a bidder's interests warrant legal protection in their own right.
In protecting these interests the courts must be careful to keep
separate the questions of legality and remedy. Recent experience
has demonstrated that the problems inherent in injunctive relief have
caused the courts to articulate too narrow a scope of judicial review.
This result is unfortunate. The courts involved possess both the
expertise and the guidelines necessary to exercise wide-scale scrutiny
over procurement decisionmaking. The important task now confronting the federal courts is to develop remedies and procedures
that will permit them to provide this broad review and thereby afford full legal protection to the rights of bidders, without jeopardizing the public's need for unhindered procurement.
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